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The Mexican Policy

of President Woodrow Wilson as it Appears to a Mexican

Lawrence F. Abbott, Esq., President of The Outlook Company, publisher of "The Outlook," says of this work by Mr. Calero:

"I have read with care, and to my surprise with deep interest, the copy of the manuscript you sent me entitled 'The Mexican Policy of President Woodrow Wilson as It Appears to a Mexican.'

"I say with surprise, because I have read an almost endless amount of material on the Mexican situation. Yet I found this particular review and interpretation of the problem more instructive and illuminating than almost anything else I have read. My judgment is that no man who reads it can fail to understand the main historical points of the present complicated relations of this country to Mexico and the effect which our policy has produced both in Mexico and in the United States.

"In spite of its uncompromising condemnation of President Wilson's course, it is written in the language and the spirit of the diplomatic gentleman."

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The Mexican Policy

of President Woodrow Wilson as it Appears to a Mexican

By

MANUEL CALERO

Secretary of Foreign Relations, and later, Ambassador to the United States, under the administration of President Francisco I. Madero

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FOREWORD.

This book has not been written in a spirit of impassioned criticism or disrespect, but solely for the purpose of fulfilling a patriotic duty.

As a Mexican citizen and as a man who has had something to do with the public affairs of Mexico, I cannot fail to see with deep discouragement and humiliation the ruin of my country, brought about by a complication of facts in which the government of the United States has played an important part.

I understand that it is perfectly proper for me to contribute to the study of this momentous question, when it is considered that in the solution of the Mexican problem the future of my country is involved.

I have tried to be impartial. To attain this end I have avoided making any statement which could not be verified with documentary evidence.

New York, N. Y., September 30, 1916.

MANUEL CALERO.

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CHAPTER I.

THE FALL OF PRESIDENT MADERO.

Early in February, 1913, a part of the garrison of the City of Mexico revolted against the government. The chief of the movement was General Bernardo Reyes. The rebels, with Reyes at their head, tried to occupy the National Palace but failed on account of the resistance which was made to them there. General Reyes perished in the attempt; and the rebels who, from that moment, were under the orders of General Felix Diaz (nephew of former president, Porfirio Diaz), marched to the arsenal — or citadel—which they occupied after a brief combat. There they shut themselves in and fortified the place.

The Government immediately determined to attack the Citadel and suppress the uprising. Troops were brought from different parts of the Republic and the command of these, as well as the direction of operations, was entrusted to General Victoriano Huerta.

After ten days of fighting, with grave damage to the buildings of the City and considerable loss of life among the inhabitants, the situation suddenly changed. General Huerta, secretly placing himself in accord with the rebels, took possession of the persons of President Madero and Vice-President Pino Suárez; the attacks against the Citadel ceased and peace again reigned in the City.

This happened on the 18th day of February, 1913.

A few hours after the President and Vice-President were arrested, General Victoriano Huerta and General Felix Diaz held a conference in which it was agreed and declared that the government of Mr. Madero had ceased, that Huerta would take charge of the Executive Power and that Diaz would reserve to himself the right of presenting himself as candidate in the presidential election which would have to be convoked. This famous conference took place in the Embassy of the United States.

The principal problem for Huerta consisted in having his authority recognized throughout the Republic. He was able to count upon the passivity of the people, but it was impossible that his spurious government would be accepted by the different military chiefs and by the governors of the twenty-seven states. The situation, however, was cleared within twenty-four hours by the attitude of President Madero and Vice-President Pino Suárez, who consented to resign their offices. The following plan was contrived for the purpose, which Mr. Madero accepted: Upon the acceptance by the Chamber of Deputies—which, according to the Mexican Constitution, is competent for the case—of the resignations of the President and Vice-President, the Minister of Foreign Relations, Lascurain, would be converted automatically into provisional President; Lascurain would appoint Huerta to the first post in the Cabinet and thereupon he would resign the Presidency in order that Huerta, at the same time, might remain, also automatically, as provisional President.

This plan was executed to the very letter.

The easy attitude of Mr. Madero and the action of the Chamber of Deputies were the salvation of Huerta. The latter was immediately recognized as President by the entire army and by the governors of twenty-five of the twenty-seven states into which the Republic is divided. The government was organized without delay and all the nations of the world, with the exception of five, recognized it as the legitimate government of Mexico.

It being a fact fully proved that Mr. Madero was a man of great personal valor, it is not easy to attribute his resignation to fear of losing his life. Although he was a prisoner when he resigned, no violence was offered to his person. Mr. Madero knew, on the other hand, as we have already noted, that the immediate effect of his resignation was to give the Presidency to Huerta, and to cover with a varnish of legality that which at bottom was a usurpation.

But Mr. Madero consented to all this, surely for the generous and patriotic purpose of avoiding further evil to the country. The Chamber of Deputies, the majority of which was devoted to Madero, lent its concurrence to the unfortunate combination, and the traitorous general was thus able to appear clothed with the character of provisional President, which he would not have been able to attain if Madero had assumed a different attitude.

If we wish to apply to these proceedings the standard of American politics, we will have to condemn them as null and without value; but if they are to be judged according to the standard of Latin-American politics, the conclusion will be different. The proceeding followed by Huerta was not of his invention; it is one which has prevailed in the countries that are found south of the Rio Grande and which is still applied and will continue to be applied for many long years in the greater part of them. The temperament, the economic factors, the political traditions, the want of preparation for self-government and, more than all, the decisive influence which is exercised by the mass of Indians, completely ignorant and illiterate, who form the overwhelming majority of the population—all this explains the difference in political methods between those countries and the more favored ones of this continent.

It does not enter into the object of this sketch to refer, not even in a brief synopsis, to the history of the changes of government in the Latin-American countries. Nor could the writer ever justify acts which are repugnant to his conscience.

But if it is desired to have an idea of the turbulent political life of those peoples, it will be sufficient to recall the case of Bolivia which in seventy-three years has suffered not less than sixty revolutions and has seen six of its presidents assassinated, and others, in greater number, obliged to seek security in exile. Was not the proceeding of Huerta the same as that which, a few days afterwards,

was applied in Peru when a military chief headed an uprising of his soldiers and took possession of the person of President Billinghurst and imprisoned him in the Penitentiary? The new Peruvian government, born in this manner out of betrayal and of military revolt, has been, nevertheless, recognized by all . . . including President Wilson!

From the moment in which the resignations of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suárez were admitted by the Chamber of Deputies, the former were converted into simple private citizens. Three days afterwards these ex-officials, who had been detained in the National Palace, were conducted toward the Penitentiary and were assassinated on the road.

The defenders of the policy of President Wilson take great pains to reverse the order of these events. As distinguished a man as the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Lane, has said: "With the elected President and Vice-President murdered and the Secretary of State (Lascurain), who was their lawful successor, cowed into submission, Huerta took the reins of power." (Authorized interview in the New York World, July 16, 1916.)

We should not fail to call attention to the political importance which the order of events has in this case. Morally judged, the assassination is as reprehensible and criminal, committed before the advent of Huerta to power as afterwards, but when it is said that Huerta obtained the government by means of the assassination of Mr. Madero, the truth is altered. It has been explained above that Huerta came into power by virtue of the resignation of President Madero and that the latter knew the material and political consequences of his own act. Mr. Madero was assassinated on the 22nd of February at midnight. Huerta had taken the oath of office as provisional President of the Republic before the Congress on the 19th.

What, then, was the motive of this odious action? The assassination of Madero was a "political crime" as in all

probability it was executed because of the fear that Madero could initiate a new and formidable revolution as soon as he should recover his liberty. Madero had dared to rebel against the strongest government that Mexico had ever had—that of General Porfirio Diaz—and had forced it to fall. Why should he not accomplish a similar feat against the men who had succeeded him?

The men who killed Madero did not assassinate any president, but a man who had ceased to be such. Assassinations of a political character are only a natural fruit of the turbulent Latin-American politics. As the governments of these countries subsist only on condition of not having active enemies, Latin-American presidents often resort to assassinations as a means to maintain peace and conserve their power. It would be easy to cite the names of *actual* presidents in Central and South American states who have used and are using homicide as a means of ridding themselves of their enemies. Mr. Carranza, the protegé of President Wilson, employs this means with astonishing frequency, in the guise of punishment for alleged treason, or of military necessity.

Such is the sad condition in which the majority of the Republics on this side of the Atlantic are found; that condition, nevertheless, is not of a permanent character. Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and perhaps some others, appear to have redeemed their politics from this shameful vice. Mexico also appeared free from it when Madero ascended to power, who, though indeed a revolutionist and a destroyer of the public order, never ordered the death of any man, and showed himself generous even to his bitterest enemies. For this reason he was overthrown.

CHAPTER II.

THE NON-RECOGNITION OF HUERTA.

A few days after the happening of the events related in the preceding chapter, Mr. Woodrow Wilson occupied the Presidency of the United States.

Huerta, following diplomatic practice, directed autographic letters to the monarchs and presidents of the countries with which Mexico maintains relations, announcing his elevation to power. All—with the exception of five—answered those letters, formal recognition of Huerta as provisional President of Mexico being thus effectuated. The American government abstained from making reply and succeeded, by means of direct requests, in having the governments of Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Cuba follow its example.

What did President Wilson propose? To deprive Huerta of the moral support which the recognition of the United States would signify for him? If such had been his object, Mr. Wilson would have been acting his part of moralist, and his attitude would have been fully justified in the field of abstract morals.

In the field of international law, however, and of the precedents of the American government, the conclusion is different. Huerta was, at least, a *de facto* ruler and he was such during many months. The American government has always recognized governments de facto, even those born of military insurrection, such as the present government of Peru which was recognized by Mr. Wilson.

In reality, in all this business of the "Mexican Policy" of President Wilson, there is a lamentable confusion of ideas. The President did not expressly recognize Huerta because he did not reply to his autographic letter; but he, nevertheless, maintained in Mexico for more than a year an Ambassador, first, and afterwards a Chargé D'Affaires. The American Ambassador officially congratulated

Huerta for his elevation to power, and President Wilson did not recall that Ambassador until five months afterward. Huerta appointed a Chargé D'Affaires in Washington who was for more than a year recognized as such. The Department of State in Washington published constantly in its monthly bulletin the name of this Chargé D'Affaires as the "Representative of Mexico." Lastly, the official relations between both governments were expressly and solemnly interrupted by the delivery of their respective passports to the Chargés D'Affaires when the forces of the United States occupied Vera Cruz in April, 1914, fourteen months after Huerta took possession of the government.

From this it cannot be said with any truth whatever that Huerta was not recognized. The *express* recognition has little to do with the case if both governments treated each other reciprocally as such governments. If the intention of Mr. Wilson was that of not recognizing Huerta, the stay of the American Embassy in Mexico had no possible explanation. It was not, indeed, for the purpose of watching over the lives and interests of the citizens of the United States, since, aside from the fact that this duty, as the whole world knows, has little concerned the present administration in Washington, such a mission could have been confided to the representative of any friendly nation, as is frequently done in practice.

It is not worth while, however, to quibble over mere words. Call it, or not, recognition of the government of Huerta, the true question is this: that *non-recognition,* a merely negative act, fell within the constitutional faculties of President Wilson, whereas to *destroy* Huerta, to throw him from power, was a positive act which did not come within the legal faculties of the President of the United States, and which is, moreover, a direct violation of international law.

That this was the real purpose of Mr. Wilson, will be amply demonstrated in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III.

THE DUEL BETWEEN PRESIDENT WILSON AND HUERTA.

In the moments of the uprising against President Madero, Huerta, drunk with joy and rum, directed a telegram to President Taft informing him that he had "overthrown the government." Secretary Bryan and others have said that this telegram was in itself sufficient reason for not recognizing Huerta, but we must not lose sight of the fact that when Huerta solicited recognition it was after the Mexican Congress had accepted him as President and had taken from him the oath of office. Still later, as has been explained, occurred the assassination of ex-president Madero.

Mr. Wilson found himself with this situation upon occupying the White House. It is easy to understand that to a spirit such as his it would have been repugnant to recognize Huerta as President of Mexico. Prudence, however, would counsel him to maintain a waiting attitude until the purposes of the new government touching the fulfillment of its international obligations had been defined. If these were duly fulfilled, there was no other road open to President Wilson, after waiting a prudent term, than that of formally recognizing Huerta in the same manner that another president of the United States had, a few years before, recognized King Peter of Servia who had mounted the throne over the bloody corpses of a king and queen, victims of an odious military insurrection.

Nevertheless, it can well be supposed that President Wilson had desired to give a lofty example of international morality in refusing absolutely to recognize a president who had arrived to power by the tortuous proceedings employed by Huerta; and even when such attitude should appear to have lost its virtue with the recognition by him of the Peruvian government, still it would have been possible to add a new motive of justification to the

attitude that we are supposing, namely that it was claimed that Huerta had stained his hands with blood.

This, or other explanations more or less plausible, could have been given to justify any innovation which President Wilson might have desired to impress upon the practices of recognition; but it was one thing not to recognize Huerta and a vastly different thing for the President to impose upon himself the task of destroying the power of Huerta.

Huerta was a usurper. But did it belong to the President of the United States to drive him from the place usurped? This was a matter that concerned exclusively the people of Mexico. If the Mexican Congress had sanctioned the usurpation, it was ridiculous to suppose that the President of the United States had the authority to undo what the Mexican Congress had done. Nevertheless, this it was, nothing less, which Mr. Wilson proposed to himself to execute and, in effect, did execute, making use, for that purpose, of every kind of means, as will be seen further on.

And it is not mere conjecture to say that President Wilson proposed to himself to overthrow Huerta. The "Democratic Text Book" of 1914, which is an enthusiastic apology of Mr. Wilson and which speaks with authority, says in this respect that the President *"notified the other governments that not only would Huerta not be recognized by the United States, but that the influence of the American Government would be exerted against him."*

Unfortunately not only was that influence used, but also the material power of the American government.

This attitude of President Wilson was baptized by himself, ironical as it may appear, by the name of the policy of "Watchful Waiting." Its first result was, nevertheless, that of strengthening Huerta instead of weakening him. It offered to the latter the occasion of exhibiting himself as champion of the national dignity, as defender of the sovereignty of Mexico against the intrusion of a foreign

government. The European press so considered it. The people of various South American cities acclaimed Huerta as a hero, the paladin of the honor of the Latin race. The special Embassy which Huerta sent to Japan was received with public enthusiasm and with great acclamations to the dictator.

The first step of President Wilson in the execution of his policy was that of stationing powerful squadrons in Vera Cruz and other Mexican ports. The government of Huerta informed that of the United States that the Mexican constitution fixed a limit of one month for the stay of foreign vessels of war in the waters of the Republic, but the notice was disregarded and the ships remained in the ports as if they had been converted into American naval stations.

Was this done out of consideration for the fact that the ships were necessary to protect the lives and property of American residents in Mexico? A negative answer is imposed. In the first place, President Wilson has not shown any interest in his countrymen in Mexico. (This has been amply proved; it does not belong to the author of these lines, who is a Mexican, to reproduce here the proofs.) In the second place, the government of Huerta was not hostile to the persons and interests of Americans, nor could there be any doubt of his ability to protect them. On the contrary, until the violent occupation of Vera Cruz by the forces of the United States, foreigners in general and Americans in particular suffered in their persons and property only in those regions occupied by the enemies of the government of Huerta.

The stay of the war vessels in Mexican waters without any practical necessity, and in defiance of the laws of the country, irritated the public sentiment and served as a sad prologue to the second step of intervention of President Wilson, which was the sending of Mr. Lind on a most stupendous mission.

Mr. John Lind arrived in Mexico with a message from

President Wilson inviting Huerta to abandon his office. Mr. Wilson suggested as a means thereof the celebration of a general election, but on the express condition that Huerta should not be a candidate.

When this step became known to the public—which was taken as the purpose of Mr. Wilson to dictate to Mexico the class of government which it must have—a sentiment of indignation was manifested everywhere. The eloquent notes with which Mr. Gamboa, Secretary of Foreign Relations, answered the memorandum of Mr. Lind, contributed to increase the general excitement. This arose to a great height when Lind indicated to Mr. Gamboa that the American government would make use of its influence to aid the Mexican government in obtaining a loan, provided Huerta would accept the conditions proposed by Mr. Wilson.

In his message to Congress on the 27th of August, 1913, President Wilson declared that Lind had discharged his mission "with singular tact," but whoever is acquainted with the Latin-American temperament will comprehend that it was an unheard of stupidity to make the offer of financial support under such circumstances, which in public was taken as a covert form of proposing a bribe as a means of obtaining the end that was sought.

Huerta took advantage of the public sentiment in his favor. President Wilson aided him in clothing his waning personality with a false prestige. The dictator accentuated his part of defender of the outraged national dignity.

Mr. Wilson, who is wholly ignorant of the temperament of Latin-American peoples, could not take account of the damage which he was causing to Mexico with the embassy of Mr. Lind. When the latter arrived in Vera Cruz, there existed against Huerta, not only among the civil element, but among the military, profound motives of discontent. It was entirely probable that a well combined movement would have overthrown the dictator, thus freeing the coun-

try of one of its most baneful governments. But all was frustrated, due to the intrusion of President Wilson. "Huerta, right or wrong," said everybody, "rather than accept a foreign imposition."

Thus strengthened, Huerta grew in audacity and felt himself capable of committing the worst outrages. Upon the invitation of President Wilson that a prompt election should be held in order that the country might return to the constitutional order, Huerta answered with the violent dissolution of the Congress, an act which completely ended all appearance of constitutional government in Mexico.

The mission of Lind having utterly failed, President Wilson applied himself to more practical proceedings.

It is known that a little while after Huerta was installed, the governor of the State of Coahuila, Venustiano Carranza, initiated a revolution against him. Very soon Carranza had to flee from his state and seek refuge in the State of Sonora whose governor, Maytorena, had also repudiated the government of Huerta. Little by little the movement—to which was given the name of "Constitutionalist," because its alleged object was the re-establishment of the Constitution—was increasing in the north of the Republic, thanks to the impetuous military action of the "General" Francisco Villa.

Mr. Wilson found a new and greatly efficient means of combatting Huerta: namely, that of strengthening the "Constitutionalists." For this purpose he raised the "embargo," that is, the prohibition which existed of exporting arms and ammunition from the United States to Mexico. With this, Villa was able to organize and arm a powerful army and the power of the revolutionary movement against Huerta was made formidable.

But because not even with this aid did the power of Huerta disappear, President Wilson resorted to a new expedient. By the efforts of the American government, the French government interposed its veto to prevent certain French bankers from completing the loan which they

had contracted with Huerta and of which he had only received one-third part.

Naturally, the government of Huerta faced threatened bankruptcy and so it was compelled to resort to extreme measures, the first of which was to suspend payment of the interest on the interior and exterior debt of Mexico. The credit of the Republic received thereby a mortal blow. But this is not the only thing that must be considered. The indirect result of the effort of Mr. Wilson is incalculably harmful if we take into account the enormous number of poor people who in Europe had invested their savings in the government bonds of Mexico, which for so many years had been esteemed as securities of the first order.

But the interventionist policy of the President arrived at its culmination in the case of the Tampico incident.

This important Mexican port was found practically besieged on the land side by the Carranza forces. Battles were taking place daily and the city was under martial law. Consequently, no one was permitted to enter or leave without express authority of the commanding general.

Under these conditions a boat belonging to the American war vessel "Dolphin" approached one of the wharves and the men who manned it disembarked without exhibiting the requisite permit. The Mexican subaltern officer who commanded the detachment charged with guarding this wharf, understood that he must comply with his duty in applying the general order which had been given in respect to exits and entrances, and he arrested the boat's crew. These were conducted to headquarters, but a few minutes afterward they were placed at liberty. After their liberation, an apology followed which the commander of the Mexican forces in Tampico gave to Admiral Mayo, commander of the American squadron stationed in the port. The admiral did not consider this sufficient satisfaction and asked that the American flag be saluted

with twenty-one guns, which the Federal Commander in Tampico did not consider himself authorized to concede.

Both governments being informed, the matter was made a diplomatic one. Huerta hastened to give a personal satisfaction to the Chargé D'Affaires of the United States and ordered that the officer who had made the arrest of the American marines should be punished. On his part, President Wilson resolved to exact the salute required by Admiral Mayo. Huerta acceded to this in principle on condition that the American government should consent to salute—also with twenty-one guns—the Mexican flag. President Wilson accepted this condition and then Huerta, with incredible stupidity, insisted that before the salutes were given, a protocol should be signed by both governments.

These delays afforded to President Wilson an exceptional opportunity to crush Huerta and he did not waste it. On the 20th of April, 1914, he presented himself before the Congress and stated that he had resolved "to insist that the flag of the United States should be saluted," and at the same time he asked the approval of Congress to use the armed forces of the United States for the purpose of obtaining from Huerta "the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States."

If the conduct of President Wilson in this case is compared with what has been followed in analogous cases, although infinitely more grave, it will be clearly seen that in the Tampico incident and in two other utterly trivial incidents which Mr. Wilson mentioned in his message to Congress, there was not the shadow of a pretext to launch against Huerta all the weight of the military forces of the United States.

Let us mention two of the cases alluded to.

First: All of the dailies published on the 29th of June, 1916, the note of the American government to the Austro-Hungarian government apropos of the attack by an Austrian submarine on the American steamship, "Petrolite." The event had such a character of gravity that the Ameri-

can government considered the conduct of the commander of the submarine "as a deliberate insult to the flag of the United States." Well, then, a *"deliberate insult"* to the American flag was an offense more grave than that of Tampico, all of whose circumstances proved that if there were an "insult," it could not be considered "deliberate." Nevertheless, in the case of the Petrolite an apology only was demanded, it being added that the American government expected it from the Austrian government, "whose high sense of honor * * would not, it is believed, permit an *indignity* to be offered *to the flag* of a friendly power." We do not know whether the apology was given or not; but contrast the attitude of President Wilson in respect to a powerful nation from which only an apology was expected when it was a question of "deliberate insults" and "indignities committed against the flag of the United States," with the brave attitude assumed against the government of Huerta which committed no deliberate insult to the flag. In the first case, an apology is asked. In the second case the apology given was repudiated and an act was exacted which, under the circumstances, was humiliating and, finally, force was made use of against the weak.

Second: On the 18th of June, 1916, a boat from the American cruiser "Annapolis" anchored in the port of Mazatlán, Mexico, directed itself to the wharf in search of refugee Americans. Two officers of the "Annapolis," who went in the boat, were arrested immediately when they set foot upon land and were conducted between Carranza soldiers, who heaped vile insults upon them and threatened to shoot them. Finally the officers were placed at liberty and obliged to re-embark; but when the boat pushed off from the wharf the Carrancistas fired upon it and killed one of the "blue-jackets." Compare this incident, in which two American officers were subjected to indignities and a marine who wore the uniform of the United States was murdered, with the occurrence at Tampico. Nevertheless, the Mazatlan incident was not made

the motive of any intemperate discussion nor was any salute to the flag exacted nor, as it appears, any especial apology. It was not Huerta who was involved but Carranza, favored and protected by President Wilson, and, therefore, the offended flag remained offended, the insulted officials remained with their insults, and the dead blue-jacket remained dead.

The message which the President read before the Congress on account of the incident of Tampico is a notable rhetorical production in which the true intention of its author is ably concealed. It would have been very crude on his part to say that his object in soliciting the approval of Congress to use the forces of the United States was that of overthrowing Huerta. Surely, even the most submissive Democrats would have mutinied at having suspected such a proposition, and the President, as it appears, foresaw the danger and very ably avoided it by choosing the pretext of an insult to the flag.

It is also clear that the American people in general and the Congress in particular fell into the net, for even today we hear repeatedly these questions: "Why was not the flag finally saluted?" "Why, if Congress resolved that the President was acting with justification, 'in the employment of the armed forces of the United States to enforce his demand for unequivocal amends for certain affronts and indignities committed against the United States,' why, they ask, were those amends never obtained?" and finally "Why did President Wilson renounce expressly in the conference of Niagara Falls, all right to exact such unequivocal amends?" The indignation of the members of Congress, especially of the Democrats, had acute manifestations when the resolution solicited by the President was under discussion. Some said that it was indispensable that "Old Glory" remain "unsullied and unspotted from insult and dishonor by greasers in Mexico." (See Congressional Record, April 22, 1914.) Mr. Underwood, the distinguished Democratic leader, pronounced

these unequivocal words: *"The flag has been dishonored* in a foreign land, on foreign soil. The President of the United States comes here to-day and though he has not asked you to declare war, asks you to sustain him in using the military forces of our government to require *a decent respect for that flag* and an honorable consideration of your government."

Before both houses of Congress had passed a resolution, Vera Cruz was taken by the naval forces of the United States. Without previous declaration of war—because it was said that this war was not war—the city was assaulted. Nineteen American marines were killed and more than seventy wounded. More than one hundred Mexicans lost their lives.

A few weeks afterward Mr. Wilson delivered an oration in the Brooklyn Navy Yard at the funeral of the victims of his aversion to Huerta. There were the nineteen corpses of the poor, brave boys whom the President sent to die in the streets of Vera Cruz, not to avenge an outrage to their flag nor to cause the dignity of the United States to be respected—things which the President never again mentioned—but to do for the Mexican people the "service" of freeing them from one who had had the audacity to refuse to submit to the dictates of President Wilson as to the kind of government which Mexico ought to have.

"We have gone down to Mexico to serve mankind," said the President in the presence of the nineteen dead bluejackets; "we want to serve the Mexicans" . . . "a war of service is a thing in which it is a proud thing to die."

In spite of this interesting confession of President Wilson, a less romantic motive has been given for the occupation of Vera Cruz than that it was "a war to serve mankind." It has been said, in effect, that the real purpose of the President was to prevent the steamship Ypiranga, which brought from Europe a cargo of arms and ammunition for Huerta, from delivering its precious

cargo. Secretary Lane, in the unfortunate defense which he makes of the "Mexican Policy" of the President, which we have mentioned above, says that as Huerta continued resisting the revolution headed by Carranza, Mr. Wilson decided to prevent him from receiving the cargo of the Ypiranga; an explanation which reveals the complicity of the American government with a revolution whose military hero was no less a person than the famous bandit, "Pancho" Villa.

But the most singular thing in this case is the fact that the Ypiranga, after entering the port of Vera Cruz, turned her prow to Puerto Mexico, a few miles further south, where she tranquilly delivered to Huerta all the arms and ammunition which she brought on board! Was it worth the pains for this result to sacrifice nearly two hundred Mexican and American lives?

It is important to finish with this deception. President Wilson did not occupy Vera Cruz to avenge the outrage to the flag, as the Congress innocently believed, and as the majority of the American people still believe. President Wilson occupied Vera Cruz, as he said metaphorically, "to serve mankind," or, as Secretary Lane says without metaphor: "to show Mexico that we were in earnest in our demand *that Huerta must go.*" (Interview in the New York World, July 16, 1916, above cited.) This fact is shamelessly admitted in the Democratic campaign text book of 1916!

No one can find in the constitution or the laws of the United States, or in the precepts of international law, the slightest foundation for these acts, nor in any code of morals a justification for the sacrifice of the lives that these acts demanded.

Was Huerta responsible for any crime against the United States? It would be difficult to prove it. He had, on the contrary, amply protected the lives and interests of Americans in Mexico. If Huerta had committed crimes against his own country it did not belong to the President

of the United States to punish him. Within one year after having abandoned Mexico, the tragic dictator disembarked publicly in the port of New York, opened an office on Broadway, was "lionized" by the newspapers, while the President of the United States, who sacrificed so many lives to punish him in Mexico, was impotent to lay the hand of a single policeman upon the "usurper." The laws of the United States served him as a shield, and only in the land where those same laws could not exercise their protective action was he made to feel the arbitrary power of the President of the United States in all its rigor.

Huerta was persecuted later when he directed himself to the South to promote—surely without the ability to carry it to a head—a revolution in Mexico. Either through stupidity or because his histrionic temperament induced him to play the part of a martyr, he fell into the net of the laws of neutrality and died a prisoner of the government of the United States.

CHAPTER IV.

PRESIDENT WILSON, PROTECTOR OF THE REVOLUTIONISTS.

Whoever may have followed the development of the revolution against Huerta is acquainted with the characteristic features of this movement. The revolutionists signalized themselves by the most cruel manifestations of savagery, by a ferocity without limits. It is true that Huerta is as responsible as Carranza for the inhuman act of sacrificing prisoners of war, whom both contending parties put to death without mercy; but the forces of Carranza committed other excesses, such as the sacking of towns, attacks against the honor of women, profanation of temples, the assassination of pacific inhabitants, the expulsion en masse of foreigners, and destruction by fire and dynamite.

To such a degree did these horrors arrive, that at one time General Scott, Chief of Staff of the American Army, presented to his "friend," Francisco Villa, the campaign regulations of the United States Army, to the end that the constitutionalist bandit, named a general by Carranza, should try to imitate the proceedings of civilized armies in time of war.

Neither the generous pains of General Scott nor the efforts of some cultivated officers who, like General Angeles, were commanding in the revolutionary files, produced any results. The "generals" born of the revolution were the first in committing every kind of excesses against honor, life, religion and property.

It was explicable that the people in general, above all, the cultivated or wealthy classes, would have more horror for the revolution than for the dictatorship of Huerta, and that they saw with astonishment that the American Government should offer its aid to the "constitutionalists."

This aid at first was indirect, in the form explained in

Chapter III, that is, by means of a series of acts hostile to Huerta; in the beginning a moral, and later, a military, hostility.

Finally the support was direct and frank.

A short time after the occupation of Vera Cruz by the forces of the United States, the city of Tampico, evacuated by the federal troops, was taken by Carranza forces. Although the American Government had just re-established, for a brief period, the embargo against the exportation of materials of war—probably because of a lukewarm protest from Carranza on account of the occupation of Vera Cruz—the Carranza agents in New York made openly and publicly a large shipment of munitions by the steamship "Antilla," destined to Tampico.

Huerta protested against the violation of the embargo and announced his purpose of blockading Tampico to prevent the munitions from arriving at their destination. To make his determination effective, he dispatched two gun-boats to Tampico.

The American Government, on learning this, declared that Tampico was an open port and that it must be kept open. The Mexican gun-boats were followed closely by powerful American cruisers, which carried the order to prevent the establishment of the blockade.

It is difficult to understand how a foreign government could proceed in this manner without committing an act of intervention in a business of strict internal regulation. What would the people of the United States have said if the British Government had declared, during the Civil War, that the ports of the South must be opened to traffic, and if it had caused its decision to be respected by means of the powerful British fleet?

The offer of the Government of Huerta to restrict the blockade to the introduction of arms and munitions for his enemies served for nothing. Washington remained inflexible and the Dictator yielded to superior

power. A few days afterwards the "Antilla" delivered her cargo into the hands of the constitutionalists.

There could no longer be any doubt regarding the attitude of President Wilson. He wished not only the elimination of Huerta, but the triumph of the faction then represented by Villa and Carranza. A new and unequivocal confirmation of this fact was given in the conference of Niagara Falls.

It will be remembered that a few days after the occupation of Vera Cruz the diplomatic representatives of Brazil, Chili, and the Argentine Republic, in Washington, tendered their good offices to resolve the difficulties between Mexico and the United States. The result of this offer was the conference of Niagara Falls which was attended by representatives of the Government of Huerta and of the American Government.

The American representatives went to the conference with the purpose of obtaining, by means of an international agreement, the establishment in Mexico of a government presided over by one of the constitutionalist leaders. They did not go, as was natural to suppose, to seek any means of putting an end to the incident created by the supposed outrage to the American flag, and to obtain the reparations which the Congress exacted when authorizing the President to make use of the army and navy of the United States. This incident had been reduced, by means of enchantment, to such a degree of insignificance, that the American delegates solemnly renounced all right, which the United States might have, to obtain reparation of any kind whatever for the acts which the President qualified as highly offensive to the dignity of his country and to the honor of the American flag!

From the beginning of the conference it could be seen that the only purpose of the mediation, so far as it interested the United States, was the expulsion of

Huerta and the delivery of the Mexican Government to those protected by President Wilson, that is to say, to the Constitutionalists. "The American Government SEEKS ONLY to assist in securing the pacification of Mexico,"—that is to say, the end of the contest between Mexicans, a matter which did not belong to the Government of the United States to arrange, nor could it be a legitimate motive for an international agreement, as it was a matter of interior regulation. "To bring that war to a close, to restore peace and constitutional government, *is the aim of the President,* and that end can only be obtained by consulting the just wish of the constitutionalists, who are not only in numerical majority, but are now the dominant force in the country." When the Mexican delegates stated that Huerta would resign the power in favor of any man who might have been neutral in the Mexican quarrels, the American delegates insisted that the provisional presidency of Mexico must be confided *"not to a neutral,"* but to a man "acceptable to the constitutionalists," because "such a man, and only such a man, can reasonably be expected to have the confidence and respect of the entire country." (All the above words between quotations are taken from the declarations of the American delegates published on the 19th of July, 1914.)

It is proper to observe that the statement of the American delegates that the constitutionalists were in numerical majority was a gross untruth which revealed the profound ignorance that distinguishes the American Government in respect to the elements of the Mexican problem. This ignorance is fully demonstrated by the single noted fact that after two years of triumph of the revolution, in which the Government of Mexico has been in the hands of the first of the constitutionalist leaders, to-wit: Carranza, "such a man" *has not* obtained "the confidence and respect of the entire country."

Carranza had been invited by the mediators to attend the conference; but under the condition that an armistice

with Huerta would be arranged. The condition was arrogantly rejected. Carranza saw clearly that his situation would not be bettered by accepting the invitation of the A. B. C. conference; he was sufficiently astute to leave the entire task to the American Government, as all the diplomatic pressure which President Wilson exercised was for the benefit of Carranza, and as Carranza counted, moreover, on the incommensurable military aid which the United States was giving him by the occupation of Vera Cruz.

Huerta could not resist this aggregate of adverse circumstances and he fell.

A most honorable man, Judge of the Federal Supreme Court, who had conserved an independent attitude during all the civil strife, Sr. Carvajal, succeeded Huerta. Carvajal saw that it was senseless to oppose the combined forces of the United States and of the revolution, and, in consequence, he sent delegates to Carranza to invite the latter to take pacific possession of the government, without any other condition of fundamental character than that of respecting life, liberty and property.

It was not the purpose of Carvajal to protect, from the wrath of the revolutionists, the assassins of Madero, or to protect those who had committed crimes during the seventeen months of the dictatorship of Huerta. All these had fled from the country or were safe in Vera Cruz under the efficient protection of General Funston. What Carvajal desired was to protect the City of Mexico and the richer and more populated portion of the Republic from the excesses which characterized the constitutionalist generals and soldiers, who had given proofs of an incredible spirit of cruelty and of rapine in all the regions of the Republic which they had traversed.

In the beginning the American Government supported the successor of Huerta in his legitimate efforts; but Carranza showed himself implacable. He insisted upon an

"unconditional surrender" and absolutely refused to bind himself to anything.

In the face of this attitude, Carvajal thought of resisting, not to conserve an official investiture which he himself considered unsustainable, but to protect the most sacred rights of Mexicans and foreigners. He had at his disposition powerful contingents which still remained of the Federal army, and he counted on the sympathy of the people who looked with horror upon the approach of their *"liberators."* By an energetic and decisive attitude Carvajal, perhaps, might have obtained what the brutal obstinacy of Carranza refused.

What could rationally be expected, in such a grave contingency, of a man so devoted to the "service of humanity" as President Wilson? Having assumed the part of protector of Carranza, it was to be supposed that he would insist in the most energetic manner that his protegé should concede the moderate and just conditions of Carvajal.

Nevertheless the very opposite happened. Carvajal received official notice that the American Government demanded that he should surrender unconditionally to Carranza. To oppose this demand would have been madness. Carvajal abandoned the capital, of which possession was taken a few days later by the Carranza hordes.

What happened then is something that the American Government has not dared to publish. The few honorable constitutionalists shudder to recall it. The Department of State has in its archives the official information of the outrages committed by the so-called constitutionalists in the great capital of Mexico. Never had the city suffered such indignities, not even in the blackest days of our revolutionary life. Even the diplomatic representatives of the foreign governments were robbed by the Carranza "generals" and by the mob of ravenous politicians that followed Carranza; even the Brazilian Minister, official representative of the United States, was robbed.

CHAPTER V.

THE TRIUMPHANT "CONSTITUTIONALISTS" AND THE RECOGNITION.

The policy of President Wilson had been crowned by two positive successes: the elimination of Huerta and the triumph of the "Constitutionalists."

To obtain these results, the President had sacrificed in Vera Cruz the lives of some twenty of his countrymen and had spent some millions of dollars, which the tax-paying Americans paid; but these sacrifices were puny compared with the enormous losses which the triumph of the "Constitutionalists" occasioned, losses in lives, in property and honor which the inhabitants of Mexico, foreigners and Mexicans, equally suffered. The quota of American citizens in this disaster is, surely, not insignificant.

And all this, for what? The President has explained it: "To serve mankind, to serve the Mexicans, to help Mexico save herself and serve her people."

There would occur to the least informed person upon theories of government, this inquiry: "What has the President of the United States to do with the quarrels of the Mexicans? Because it is simple common sense, if not an axiom, that the American Government was not instituted to act outside of its territory, in the service of humanity or the Mexicans, as the man who temporarily occupies the White House may understand this service; but rather to act in the service of Americans who may be in a foreign country and of the legitimate interests of the latter.

But a singular thing: in all this history of the intrusion of President Wilson in Mexico, there is not a single act calculated to protect Americans in that country. All that appears to have inspired the President's activities has been a series of strange motives, such, for example, as his

"passion for the submerged eighty-five per cent of the people of that Republic, who are struggling toward liberty." (Interview in "The Saturday Evening Post," May 23rd, 1914.)

Let it not be understood that the author of these lines censures the President for not having concerned himself with the protection of Americans in Mexico, since that is not incumbent upon the writer, as a Mexican; but if attention is called to this circumstance, it is only to emphasize the absurdity of the position taken by the President of the United States who, instead of looking after the welfare of his countrymen, has concerned himself with promoting the welfare of the Mexicans, with results so completely negative that it can be affirmed with entire truth that never has Mexico been poorer, hungrier and more oppressed by an anarchical and criminal faction than at this very day. (September, 1916.) The present Mexican Government—if it is to be called such—a creature of President Wilson, has been declared by Secretary Lansing "not worthy of the name," since it has proved its "neglect" and its "failure" to fulfill "the paramount obligation for which governments are instituted," to-wit, "the protection of life and property." (Note of Secretary of State to Carranza, June 20th, 1916.)

With the triumph of the "Constitutionalists" the object for which President Wilson took Vera Cruz, the expulsion of Huerta, was attained. In reality, that object would have been fulfilled when the dictator left the country in the hands of Mr. Carvajal. In any case, it was said that the whole country was dominated by the revolution when Carranza occupied the capital of the Republic in August, 1914, and, therefore, Vera Cruz, should have been delivered at that time by the American Government.

The apparent explanation of the stay of the American troops in Vera Cruz after the triumph of "Constitutionalism" was the rupture between Villa and Carranza. The

first demanded that the plan of the revolution should be complied with, which was the return to constitutional government, while Carranza pretended to continue being "First Chief" with unlimited powers.

It was explicable that Mr. Wilson should be perplexed and that he should decide not to abandon the base which he was occupying in Mexican territory, when a second civil war was threatening between the same men for whose sake Vera Cruz had been occupied. Mr. Wilson then determined to send to Mexico, as his confidential agent, a learned and honorable man, acquainted with the country and who spoke the Spanish language with perfection, Mr. Paul Fuller.

The report of Mr. Fuller justified the attitude of Villa. For the first time the bandit,—well advised by upright and patriotic men—had reason on his side. Everyone who may be acquainted with the opinions of Mr. Fuller knows that the latter condemned Carranza whom he declared "an impossibility," devoured by personal ambition to rule.

And this was natural and logical. Carranza could not at sixty and more years of age transform himself into an apostle of liberty and into a reformer. He had passed twenty-five years of his life serving with humility the man whom today he calls, with disdain, the Tyrant of Mexico, Porfirio Diaz. Carranza was a senator under the Government of Diaz and never did anything else in the Senate except to approve, without the slightest protest, the recommendations of that tyrant, whom today he denies. In the two years in which he was the Governor of the State of Coahuila, Carranza promoted nothing which would reveal him as the reformer which he now pretends to be, nor did he do anything for the political, moral or economic advancement of the people.

Not only this, but Carranza, enemy of progressive innovations, *was the only Governor* who opposed having schools established in the States under the auspices of

the Federal Government, when President Madero, in execution of a law initiated in the time of Diaz, was trying to diffuse elementary instruction in a country in which eighty-five per cent of the population does not know how to read or write.

This is the true Carranza, the man who, together with Villa received the aid of the United States in seizing the Government of Mexico.

It was explicable, we repeat, that in view of the reports of Mr. Fuller and of the rupture between Villa and Carranza, President Wilson should hesitate to evacuate Vera Cruz. It would not, in effect, "have served the Mexicans," if he abandoned them in the midst of a frightful anarchy.

But the Congressional elections were approaching in the United States and thus it was necessary to present a triumph of the policy of "watchful waiting." The President announced on the 15th of September that Vera Cruz would be evacuated "in view of the entire removal of the circumstances which were thought to justify the occupation." The evacuation was carried through, nevertheless, two months later when Carranza, fugitive before the pursuit of Villa, arrived at the Gulf coast and would soon have abandoned the country. President Wilson charged himself with saving him by delivering to him Vera Cruz.

The possession of this important port and of the region round-about permitted Carranza to rehabilitate himself, and his General Obregon to initiate an active campaign against Villa. Civil war was again kindled with savage fury.

In the face of the horrors of this struggle and the ruin which it brought for the Mexican people, President Wilson believed himself obliged to intervene again. With an innocent good faith which demonstrates his want of knowledge of the character of this class of contests in Latin-American countries, the President directed on June

2nd, 1915, a solemn admonition to the leaders of the divided "Constitutionalism," to whom he said: "I therefore publicly and *very solemnly* call upon the leaders of faction in Mexico to act, to act together and to act promptly for the relief and redemption of their prostrate country."

Carranza and Villa, by way of reply, impressed upon the struggle a greater character of ferocity. When the results of the war began to be adverse to the faction of Villa, the latter addressed himself to the American Government, stating his desire to comply with the admonition. Carranza, on his part, declared that he was not disposed to compromise with his enemies, nor to admit that President Wilson should meddle with the internal affairs of Mexico.

Lost in the labyrinth, Mr. Wilson called to his aid six countries of Latin-America. The plenipotentiaries accredited to Washington from Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Gautemala, were invited by the Secretary of State to a conference over the internal affairs of Mexico.

We shall not make the tiresome relation of those negotiations, whose first result was a joint note from the seven countries directed to the chiefs of factions in Mexico in which the latter were invited to compose their differences in a pacific manner and to organize a Government in common accord.

Although the concurrence of six Latin-American countries made this act of intervention in Mexico's internal affairs a little less unpalatable for the Mexicans, Carranza remained inflexible and haughtily refused the invitation. The other chiefs of faction, for the most part, accepted it.

To the surprise of everybody, the Government of the United States at this moment changed its attitude and resolved to recognize Carranza as the government *de facto*. This, as we shall see in the following chapter,

involved a stupendous contradiction of the principles which President Wilson had proclaimed, to the effect that he would not accept in Mexico a government which should not be in conformity with the constitution of the country. To reconcile this contradictory position, Secretary Lane, in his defense of the President (Interview in the New York World) asserts that the recognition of Carranza was unanimously recommended by the six countries of Latin-America, and that the United States yielded to their recommendations in deference to the Pan-American policy adopted by President Wilson. Very much against our will we must say that this is not correct. The opinion of the conference was profoundly divided; and, although one of the Latin-American representatives constituted himself a champion of "Carranzaism," it was the reiterated efforts of the American Government which determined the resolution of the conference to recognize Carranza.

It is not, therefore, legitimate to defend President Wilson in one of his most notable inconsistencies by throwing the initial responsibility for the recognition of Carranza upon those who, to proceed as they did, took into account the fact that the United States had a greater interest in Mexican affairs than any other nation whatever, even if it were only for the fact that to the Government of Washington, alone, belongs the responsibility of being one of the determining factors of the frightful situation of moral, economic and political ruin to which the Mexican people have been reduced.

CHAPTER VI.

OUGHT THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO HAVE RECOGNIZED CARRANZA?

To answer the question that is expressed in the above title, it is necessary to be acquainted with the principles that President Wilson had announced as to the class of government which, in his opinion, Mexico should have, and then to judge the recognition of Carranza in the light of those principles.

The fact must not be lost sight of that the President always considered Huerta a "usurper" and so designated him in various official documents. Mr. Wilson never admitted that Huerta was a constitutional President.

That Mr. Wilson could recognize as the Government of Mexico only one which should be organized in conformity with the constitution of the country is revealed from the following declarations:

I. In the message which the President read before the Congress on the 27th of August, 1913, he said:

> "America in particular—America north and south and upon both continents—waits upon the development of Mexico; and that development can be sound and lasting only if it be the product of a genuine freedom, a just and ordered Government *founded upon law* * * * Mexico has a great and enviable future before her, if only she choose and attain the paths of honest *constitutional government.*"

II. On account of the violent dissolution of the Mexican Congress consummated by Huerta in October, 1913, Mr. John Lind made known to Huerta that President Wilson considered it necessary to organize immediately *"a constitutional government."* In the same communication Mr. Lind indicated the convenience of the withdrawal

of Huerta in order to assure "absolute liberty of action in the restoration of *constitutional* power."

III. In his message to Congress on December 2nd, 1913, the President expressed himself thus:

> "We are the friends of *constitutional* government in America; we are more than its friends, we are its champions; because *in no other way* can our neighbors work out their development in peace and liberty. MEXICO HAS NO GOVERNMENT."
>
> "We shall not, I believe, be obliged to alter our policy of *watchful waiting*. And then, when the end comes, we shall hope to see CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER *restored in distressed Mexico* by the concert and energy of such of her leaders as prefer the liberty of their people to their own ambitions."

IV. Again, in his special message to Congress of the 20th of April, 1914, the President said:

> "If we are to accept the tests of its own constitution (Mexico's) *it has no government.*"

V. On the 23rd of April, 1914, the President gave some declarations to the newspapers in which he asserted that he would respect the sovereignty of Mexico, and added:

> "The feeling and intention of the Government in this matter are not based upon policy. They go much deeper than that. They are based upon a genuine friendship for the Mexican people and a profound interest in the *re-establishment of a constitutional system.*"

VI. In his declarations in "The Saturday Evening Post" of the 23rd of May, 1914, the President expressed himself as follows:

> "In any event, we shall deem it our duty to help the Mexican people and *we shall continue*

until we have satisfactory knowledge that peace has been restored, *that a constitutional government is reorganized,* and that the way is open for the peaceful reorganization of that harassed country."

VII. On the 18th of June, 1914, the American delegates to the conference of Niagara Falls gave the press some declarations among which appear the following statements:

"To bring that war (Mexico's civil war) to a close, to restore peace and CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, *is the aim of the President.*"

VIII. In the admonition of the 2nd of June, 1915, hereinbefore related (Chapter V), are found the following words:

"But neither do they (the people of the United States) wish to see utter ruin come upon her (Mexico) and they deem it their duty as friends and neighbors to lend any aid they properly can to any instrumentality which promises to be effective in bringing about a settlement which will embody *the real objects of the revolution,*—CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT and the rights of the people * * *. "It is time therefore that the Government of the United States should frankly state the policy which, in these extraordinary circumstances, it becomes its duty to adopt. It must presently do what it has not hitherto done or felt at liberty to do, lend its active moral support to some man or group of men * * * who can rally the suffering people of Mexico to their support in an effort to ignore, if they cannot unite, the warring factions of the country, RETURN TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC *so long in abeyance* and SET UP A GOVERNMENT AT MEXICO CITY which the great powers of the world *can recognize.*"

IX. On the 14th of August, 1915, Secretary Lansing and the six Latin-American ambassadors and ministers directed to the Mexican factions—as has been said hereinbefore (Chapter V.), a joint invitation, drafted in the Department of State, and from which the following statements are transcribed:

> "We, the undersigned, believe that if the men directing the armed movements in Mexico—whether political or military chiefs—should agree to meet, either in person or by delegates, far from the sound of cannon and with no other inspiration save the thought of their afflicted land, there to exchange ideas and to determine the fate of the country—from such action would undoubtedly result the strong and unyielding agreement requisite to the creation of a provisional government, *which should adopt the first steps necessary* to THE CONSTITUTIONAL RECONSTRUCTION of the country and to issue *the first and most essential of them all,* THE IMMEDIATE CALL TO GENERAL ELECTIONS'.'

The exhortations and demands of President Wilson have never concerned Carranza. Defaulting in the promise which he made to the Mexicans at initiating the revolution—the re-establishment of constitutional government at the elimination of Huerta—Carranza has pretended to establish a dictatorship, by the side of which those of Santa Anna and Huerta appear like the play of children.

His first act upon triumphing was to close the tribunals of justice. From the few judges whom he has installed, he has exacted the oath of fulfilling and obeying the decrees of the "First Chief."

He suspended the individual guaranties of the Constitution and, consequently, there is no recourse in Mexico against attacks upon liberty, life, property or the hearthstone.

He permitted and authorized the most repugnant attacks upon religious liberty.

He muzzled the press and permitted only the publication of newspapers that flattered the First Chief and applauded all his acts.

He has prohibited, under severe penalties, every political meeting or association.

He has issued not less than three decrees *which amend the Constitution, itself, of the Republic.*

He has disorganized the entire mechanism of the Government and has arrogated to himself the right to issue fiduciary money, which has brought economic ruin upon the country and upon thousands of Mexicans and foreigners.

This was the character of the "Government" of Mexico in October, 1915, when it was accorded recognition.

And Carranza did not conceal it. To the courteous note of the American Government and the six associated Latin-American Governments, in which he was requested to arrange his differences with the other chiefs of faction to the end that a constitutional government might be established in Mexico and elections might be held, Carranza answered in bombastic terms, declining the invitation and requiring that he should be recognized. Carranza reached the culmination of insolence when he sent to the Department of State a decree of his own, issued at Vera Cruz on the 12th of December, 1914, by which he assumes all the public powers and in which he invested himself ("the Chief of the Revolution is hereby expressly authorized," says the decree) with all the faculties that may be imagined, one of these being that of convoking, when Carranza may esteem it proper, a Congress to amend and ratify—it is not said whether it will also be able to revoke—the military decrees which Carranza may issue!!

President Wilson had said: "What Mexico needs is *Constitutional government;* Mexico has no government *if the tests of its own constitution are to be accepted;* my

aim is *the restoration of constitutional government,* because *in no* other way can our neighbors work out their development in peace and liberty * * *"

Carranza answered: "Neither constitutional government nor elections; I am above the Constitution; the country will return to legal rule when I may wish and as I may wish it. Recognize me!"

And President Wilson recognized him.

The recognition was made on the 19th of October, 1915, in a letter not only courteous, but affectionate, which the Secretary of State directed to Señor Arredondo, Confidenial Agent of Carranza in Washington.

Almost a year has passed since the date of the recognition and Mexico continues under the anarchical dictatorship of Carranza.

The latter, in order to make it believed that the country is on the way of returning soon to legal rule, issued in July, 1916, a decree in which he orders that the municipal power shall be reconstituted in the entire Republic (up to this time it has been abolished by Carranza); but the same decree disposes that every question regarding the validity of the elections of the members of the municipal bodies or councils, shall be decided by the respective military governor named by Carranza!

He has also issued a decree for the re-establishment of the lower courts of Federal justice; but in the same decree he declares that the individual guaranties shall remain suspended, as well as the Constitution, and, therefore, the Federal Courts will not be able to decide any question in accordance with the Constitution.

Considering that Mr. Wilson graciously consented, by recognizing Carranza, to subvert all his principles insisted upon during two years, it might be thought that, for other reasons, Carranza was entitled to recognition. For example, it might be supposed that, arbitrary as it is, the power of Carranza was respectable for its morality and efficiency. Let us clear up this question, judging the

recognition in the light of the official documents of the American Government itself.

The following passages are copied from the note which Secretary Lansing directed to the Minister of Foreign Relations of the "Government de facto," on June 20th, 1916:

> "The Government of the United States has viewed with deep concern and increasing disappointment the progress of the revolution in Mexico. Continuous bloodshed and disorders have marked its progress. *For three years* the Mexican Republic has been torn with civil strife; the lives of Americans and other aliens have been sacrificed; vast properties developed by American capital and enterprise have been destroyed or rendered nonproductive; bandits have been permitted to roam at will through the territory contiguous to the United States and to seize, without punishment or without effective attempt at punishment, the property of Americans, while the lives of citizens of the United States who ventured to remain in Mexican territory or to return there to protect their interests have been taken, and in some cases barbarously taken, and the murderers have neither been apprehended nor brought to justice. It would be difficult to find in the annals of the history of Mexico conditions more deplorable than those which have existed there *during these recent years* of civil war."

As it is seen, the picture of the situation in Mexico which Mr. Lansing makes comprehends the last three years and, therefore, Carranza was recognized as a Government when the most horrible anarchy was reigning in Mexico and it was not proper to say that there was any Government.

Secretary Lansing continues:

> "It would be tedious to recount instance after instance, outrage after outrage, atrocity after atrocity to illustrate the true nature and extent of the widespread conditions of lawlessness and violence which have prevailed. During the past nine months in particular * * *"

(As is to be supposed, given the date of the note, this period of nine months had already begun to run when recognition was granted, which was on the 19th of October, 1915).

> "During the past nine months *in particular* the frontier of the United States along the lower Rio Grande has been thrown into a state of constant apprehension and turmoil because of frequent and sudden incursions into American territory and depredations and murders on American soil by Mexican bandits, who have taken the lives and destroyed the property of American citizens, sometimes carrying American citizens across the international boundary with the booty seized. American garrisons have been attacked at night, American soldiers killed and their equipment and horses stolen; American ranches have been raided, property stolen and destroyed and American trains wrecked and plundered. The attacks on Brownsville, Red House Ferry, Progreso Post Office and Las Peladas, all occurring during September last *are typical.*"

Observe that these typical attacks occurred in September, *during the month preceding the recognition.*

But the most interesting thing is what Mr. Lansing adds: "In these attacks on American territory, Carrancista adherents, and even *Carrancista soldiers* took part in the looting, burning and killing."

Mr. Lansing continues: "Not only were these murders characterized by ruthless brutality, but uncivilized acts of mutilation were perpetrated. Representations were made to General Carranza and he was emphatically requested to stop these reprehensible acts *in a section which he has long claimed to be under the complete domination of his authority.* Notwithstanding these representations and the promise of General Nafarrate to prevent attacks along the international boundary, in the following month of October * * *"

Note well that this was in the month of October, to-wit, in the month of the recognition.

"* * * in the following month of October a passenger train was wrecked by bandits and several persons killed seven miles north of Brownsville, and an attack was made upon United States troops at the same place several days later. Since these attacks, leaders of the bandits *well known both to Mexican civil and military authorities,* as well as to American officers, *have been enjoying with impunity the liberty of the towns of northern Mexico.* So far has the *indifference* of the de facto Government to these atrocities gone, that some of these leaders, as I am advised, have received *not only the protection* of that Government, BUT ENCOURAGEMENT AND AID AS WELL."

It thus appears that Carranza was recognized in the precise moment in which his own soldiers were committing sackage, incendiarism and homicides on American territory; when the authors of these outrages were passing thereafter to Mexico and were enjoying impunity and liberty, notwithstanding their being known to the Carrancista authorities; and when the so-called government de facto and its subordinates not only manifested indifference for these acts, but were *encouraging and aiding* the bandits.

How can the recognition be justified under these conditions, if all the circumstances proved that Carranza

could be the chief of a band of malefactors, but never the head of a government?

But the note of Secretary Lansing explains his enigma:

> "When the superiority of the revolutionary faction led by General Carranza became undoubted, the United States, after conferring with six others of the American Republics, recognized unconditionally the present de facto Government."

The first thing that occurs to us to observe is that the circumstance that one *revolutionary faction* may be *superior* to others that exist in the country, is not a rational motive for declaring that faction to be the government of the country. A faction as, with justice, Mr. Lansing calls "Carranzaism," is not and cannot be a government.

Now let us see that what, in reality, took place was, that Mr. Wilson proposed to experiment with Carranza; and even when common sense counselled him to postpone recognition until the experiment, as made, should result favorably, Mr. Wilson did the very reverse. "It (the United States) hoped that that Government (Carranza's) would speedily restore order and provide the Mexican people and others, who had given their energy and substance to the development of the great resources of that Republic, opportunity to rebuild in peace and security their shattered fortunes."

Naturally, the experiment resulted in a gigantic fiasco, which makes Secretary Lansing say, with melancholy disillusion: "This Government has waited *month after month* for the consummation of its hope and expectation."

It appears incredible that Carranza should have been recognized as *the Government* only in the "hope" and under the "expectation" that he might be able to come to be a government.

We would recall here the phrase of Horace—"risum teneatis"—if it were not for the tragic results which the blind measures of the American Government have produced for a country, before prosperous and respectable, and now the object of universal commiseration.

To flatter his chief, the distinguished Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Lane, declared: "President Wilson's Mexican policy is one of the things of which I am most proud;" but he will be able to make only fools, or those who are unacquainted with the President's course, believe that that policy has been "definite and consistent, firm and constructive."

CHAPTER VII.

THE FIRST CONSEQUENCES OF THE RECOGNITION—SANTA ISABEL AND COLUMBUS.

Whoever may have read the chapter immediately preceding will have been convinced that upon declaring that Carranzaism was Government, President Wilson forgot that famous aphorism of his,—"If we are to accept the tests of its own constitution, Mexico has no Government." Let us apply, in effect, the "tests" of the constitution of Mexico to that "First Chief," who has invested himself with all the powers, including that of amending the constitution, and we will have to conclude with Mr. Wilson that "Mexico has no Government." The constitution of Mexico, it will be understood, is a copy of that of the United States.

Carranza is trying to govern Mexico, not as provisional President, or with any other character that may have some appearance of constitutional function, but simply as "First Chief," like a "Sheik" who rules despotically over a tribe of Bedouins.

If that Sheik had at any time exercised control of the country, preserving order "in fact," which is the basis of all organization, President Wilson would have had some excuse for declaring him a government "de facto;" but we have already seen in the preceding chapter that when Carranza was recognized he was only the chief of a faction and that he was declared a *government de facto,* not because he was such, but because Mr. Wilson had the hope that he might become such.

The act of recognizing Carranza was not indeed inspired, like the occupation of Vera Cruz, by the purpose of "serving humanity," but by another purpose more prosaic and business-like. It was necessary, in effect, to present to the new American Congress, which was to be

convened in December (1915) and whose political composition revealed a change in the public sentiment, something which would signify a radical modification of the ridiculed policy of *"watchful waiting."* It was important also to make the public believe that the efforts of the President had produced the admirable result that Mexico finally had a Government. To completely confuse public opinion, came, as from a mould, the complacent and solicited cooperation of six Latin-American countries.

The President nevertheless, had the frankness to confess that he was making a new experiment. "Whether we have benefited Mexico, by the course we have pursued, *remains to be seen,"* he said, in his message to Congress on the 7th of December, 1915.

The new experiment resulted in a new fiasco, as the note of Secretary Lansing, analyzed in the preceding chapter, proves.

The problem which President Wilson tried to resolve, with the recognition of Carranza, was complicated by a factor which it was indispensable to eliminate. We refer to Francisco Villa. The President did not hesitate to declare war on him, and Villa took up the glove.

It is worth while to relate the history of the relations of the Government of the United States with the famous Mexican bandit; but we shall make only a brief recapitulation of that history, indispensable for comprehending the present state of the international situation of Mexico.

The revolution which Carranza headed acquired military importance, thanks to the soldierly qualities of Francisco Villa. The triumphs of the latter attracted to his person universal attention. The bandit was transformed into a general, and began to be officially designated with this title by the American Government.

The personality of Villa was acquiring international character. Astute and ambitious, he comprehended that it was important for him to gain the good-will of the United States and to exploit in his behalf the unfavorable

impression which Carranza was causing in Washington by his obstinacy and want of malleability. Villa, on his part, showed himself always complacent and lost no opportunity of flattering President Wilson and Secretary Bryan.

From all this resulted a preference, constantly more accentuated, on the part of the Government of the United States toward Francisco Villa, to whom was shown the honor of attaching to him an American Confidential Agent, who accompanied him everywhere. And this was not due, surely, to a transformation in the criminal spirit of Villa; but Carranza showed himself so incapable and impertinent, that the Government at Washington began to believe that in the bandit-general Mexico must place its hopes of redemption. "The one-time bandit has become a military genius; why not a peacemaker and a statesman?" said the daily, most friendly to the Administration, illustrating its editorial with a cartoon, in which Mr. Wilson extends his hand to the bandit. (The New York World, June 22, 1914.)

Secretary Bryan, on his part, was coquetting with the assassin of the Englishman, Benton, and of the American, Bauch. On the 2nd of September (1914), upon Villa's return from Sonora where he had gone on a pacifying mission, Mr. Bryan telegraphed him, sending him "the sincere thanks" of the American Government, and adding these words: "Your patient labors in this matter *are greatly appreciated* by the State Department and the President."

To such extremes did this singular attitude arrive, that the well-informed—if not inspired—correspondent of the New York World in Washington, said on the 23rd of November (1914), "President Wilson has great faith in Villa's ability to handle the situation."

But if these and other data which we could present were not sufficient indication of the sympathy of the American Government for Villa, we refer to the speech de-

livered on the 4th of August, 1916, by Senator James Hamilton Lewis, "Democratic whip of the Senate," in which, by way of defense of the policy of President Wilson, he asserted that the latter was on the point of recognizing Villa "as a test and trial;" a statement which throws to the ground the principal argument of those who defend the conduct of the President towards Huerta as highly moral, since if the latter was considered an assassin, Villa was notoriously such and on a greater scale.

With the antecedents which we have just pointed out it is not surprising that the Government of the United States should carry its attentions toward the bandit to the extreme of sending to him, as special ambassador, no less a person than the Chief of Staff of the American Army. This happened in August, 1915.

Villa had dictated a series of confiscatory decrees and was trying to obtain from the mining companies that operated in his territory a large advance in cash. The Washington Government resolved, contrary to its custom, to protect the American companies affected by these iniquitous decrees of Villa; but instead of boldly taking an attitude against him, which would have been in consonance with the dignity of the United States, it resolved to treat him as an equal and it imposed upon General Scott the humiliating mission of going to appease the brigand. Villa considered the American general as his "colleague" and received him with honors when Scott passed over to Juarez to *present his respects* to Villa. The honors were reciprocated on the following day by the forces of the United States, when the Mexican "general" went to El Paso to pay a visit to General Scott. The object of the trip of the latter was, indeed, fruitful, since Villa revoked some of his arbitrary decrees; but the spirit of the bandit was inflated with pride at feeling himself considered as of the necessary importance to have sent to him, as a procurator, the first figure in the American Army.

Such was the condition of the relations between the

Washington Government and Francisco Villa when the Department of State, assisted by the representatives of six Latin-American countries directed to Carranza, to Villa and to the other chiefs of faction, joint notes, inviting them to compose their differences and to form a government by common accord. (Chapter V.)

Villa accepted, with good will, the invitation and named his delegates, who immediately proceeded to Washington. It was beyond all doubt that Villa still dominated an important portion of the northern part of the Mexican Republic, and could not rationally be considered as an insignificant factor in the political entanglement of Mexico.

A few weeks later, to the great surprise of Villa and of everybody, Carranza was recognized. Not even was the courtesy shown of first withdrawing the joint invitation to which Villa had given such prompt acceptance. The wild beast felt the humiliation in all its cruel intensity. How, after having been the depositary of the hopes of the American Government, after having always had at his side a confidential representative of President Wilson, after being called a military genius by the press of the United States, after, in fine, having had sent to him General Scott as ambassador, and after the soldiers of the United States had presented arms to him, was he now repudiated, in discourteous form, unceremoniously, and his rival Carranza recognized as the ruler of Mexico?

In fact, however odious may be the personality of Villa, the conduct of the American Government was, at least, illogical.

It was, also, imprudent. Villa represented a force, an infernal force, which would surely be turned against his former protector.

President Wilson must have comprehended this and he determined to aid Carranza in order that the latter might crush Villa with rapidity.

The first thing he did was to establish an embargo

upon arms and munitions in respect to the ports of the frontier which Villa still held in his possession.

The second thing was to permit Carranza to convert the territory of the United States into a strategic base for his operations against Villa. Thus upon his arrival at the frontier town of Agua-Prieta, with the purpose of taking it, Villa found the Carranza garrison formidably reinforced with fresh troops. These troops had been sent rapidly through territory of the United States and upon American railroads, at the same time that the forces of Villa were moving slowly and laboriously along the rough highways of Chihuahua and Sonora.

Villa felt himself lost. In face of the attitude of the Washington Government, the Villa troops began to desert. His generals went over to Carranza or sought refuge in the United States. The indignation of the bandit knew no limits and he swore vengeance. To his criminal spirit there were no distinctions. He thought to avenge himself upon President Wilson as well by sacrificing the lives of innocent, peaceful Americans, as by assaulting a camp of American troops. The eighteen victims who were butchered at Santa Isabel, those who fell in the Columbus raid, are victims immolated upon the altars of the imprudent friendship of Mr. Wilson for Carranza.

The President cannot consider himself fortunate in his Mexican adventure. Each step of his has brought with it some disaster, when not bloody hecatombs.

CHAPTER VIII.

FROM COLUMBUS TO CARRIZAL.

How to satisfy public opinion, justly outraged by the Columbus "raid?"*

If a party of Canadian bandits had assaulted and sacked a settlement in North Dakota, President Wilson would not have sent against the malefactors a punitive expedition. If an American bandit had sacked a settlement in Manitoba, the Canadian government would not have sent in his pursuit a punitive expedition.

It is clearly seen, in either one of these two cases, that it would have been an attack against the sovereignty of the respective countries to send from the neighboring country a punitive expedition. The people of the United States would never consent to this attack. Much less would they tolerate the entrance into the United States in pursuit of a malefactor, of a column of eight or ten thousand soldiers of the Canadian Army and that, after having lost the trail of the fugitive, the column, instead of returning to Canada, for failure of the object of the expedition, should station itself indefinitely upon American soil and establish a formal camp from a hundred to a hundred and fifty miles south of the dividing line.

But, Oh, human injustice! that which would not be tolerated from the neighbor on the north, is practiced on the neighbor of the south. What would be considered an offense, if it were a question of suffering it, is held as a permissible act when it is a case of doing it.

The act is more censurable and less honorable to the

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*Note. As is well known, a party of the followers of Villa fell upon Columbus, New Mexico, on the morning of the 9th of March, 1916, surprising a strong detachment of United States troops which were encamped there. The Villaistas were obliged to retire, but after having sacked and burned the principal part of the town and having killed and wounded a large number of persons.

one who executes it, when the victim is weak and lacks the forces to compel respect for the inviolability of its territory.

According to the position taken by the United States, Mexico has a government, *recognized unconditionally.* It is the fault of the Washington government that it declared to be a government of Mexico, what was simply an instrument of tyranny, disorganized and, at the same time, impotent; but the honor and self-respect of the American government—apart from what the theories of international law may provide—clearly indicated its duty after the attack on Columbus. That duty was alternative: either to exact from Carranza the pursuit of the malefactors, who had fled to Mexican soil, and their arrest and delivery to the authorities of the United States; or, indeed, if Carranza was considered impotent to fulfill these fundamental obligations, to break all relations with the "de facto government" and to dispatch the punitive expedition, leaving upon Carranza the responsibility of declaring war if he did not accept the sending of the expedition.

But what could not be done without committing an attack against the principles of international law, was to resolve upon the dispatch of the punitive expedition without either obtaining the consent of the "de facto government" or breaking off relations with it.

On the following day after the "raid" this resolution of the President of the United States was published: "An adequate force will be sent at once in pursuit of Villa with the single object of *capturing him* and putting a stop to his forays." The resolution added—what was a cruel sarcasm—that the punitive expedition would be conducted with scrupulous respect to the sovereignty of Mexico.

It has been said—even by President Wilson himself—that the punitive expedition was sent in virtue of an agreement with the "government de facto." This is an

error, notorious to everyone who may have studied this unfortunate incident. In any case, and even had there been a subsequent agreement, the fact is that when the President made known to the public that he would dispatch the punitive expedition, Carranza had not only not been consulted, but not even notified.

But if the expedition was an attack from the point of view of international law, it was useless from a practical standpoint. General Pershing was to "capture" Villa, and the latter, six months later, is laughing at his pursuers and harassing the Carranzistas with impunity.

It is surprising that it should not occur to a man as intelligent as President Wilson to think that with the advantage of six or eight days, which was given to Villa—the time which, as will be remembered, it took General Pershing to prepare himself—it would be impossible to overtake a bandit, audacious, astute, acquainted as no one else with the complicated topography of the region, accustomed to live perpetually as a fugitive, and who could count, moreover, on the sympathy of the native population.

And then, what limits would the expedition have? Would it go, if it should be necessary, to the frontier of Guatemala?

Very soon the difficulties of the undertaking began to appear.

Carranza, who had never consented to the expedition, nevertheless did not have the force to repel it, in consequence of which he limited himself to placing very kind of difficulty in its way, and to these, on its part, the American government submitted with meekness. The expedition was marching between two lines of railroad, but was not permitted to use either of them. Carranza prohibited it from entering towns, and it did not enter. But, in spite of all, it continued to advance until it had to halt and

double back when its advances were opposed by the Carrancista force in Parral.

At this point the government of Washington should have opened its eyes and, recognizing with valor and honor the position, at once ridiculous and perilous, in which it had been placed, it should have ordered the return of General Pershing to the United States.

Because if the expedition were useless, as, in effect, it was, why insist upon it?

On the contrary, if the expedition were useful and legitimate, why not then carry it forward, cost what it might, as becomes a government which esteems its own dignity?

But Mr. Wilson chose a middle course. He neither withdrew the column nor did he permit it to go forward for the purpose of "capturing Villa," for which it had been dispatched.

Later we shall try to present the only possible explanation of this contradictory and ungraceful position: the personal political interests of Mr. Wilson.

In honor of the truth, Carranza did what he could, considering his situation of extreme weakness, to obtain the withdrawal of the useless punitive expedition, whose continuation in Mexico is a constant offence to the patriotic sentiment of the Mexicans. Forced by this sentiment, Carranza notified the Washington government of his intention to forcibly resist any attempt whatever of the column of General Pershing to advance.

The Department of State, in a very solemn tone, made known to Carranza that any act of force whatever on his part would bring the "gravest consequences"; but Carranza, who knew, as all the world does, the innocuousness of this high sounding diplomatic literature of the Department of State, gave orders to his military chiefs to resist any advance of the American forces.

The result of all this was the combat of Carrizal, in which a small American column was destroyed with sensible loss of life for both parties. The "gravest consequences" which this practical demonstration of Carranza's earnestness produced were a declaration of the Secretary of State, in a note dated two weeks after the occurrence of Carrizal (July 7th), in which he speaks of the spirit of *friendship* and *solicitude* which animates the American government for the continuation of *cordial relations* between both governments!!

CHAPTER IX.

THE CRUEL SIDE OF THE POLICY OF MR. WILSON.

On the 14th of March, 1912, the Congress of the United States enacted a law in the following terms:

"That whenever the President shall find that in any American country conditions of *domestic violence* exist which are promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war *procured from the United States,* and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export except under such limitations and exceptions as the President shall prescribe, any arms or munitions of war from any place in the United States to such country * * *."

This law, as is seen, is not imperative, since it leaves to the President's discretion to establish an embargo when he may judge that a state of "domestic violence" is fomented by the use of war materials of American origin. But, in spite of this, the spirit of the law is clear.

The Congress wished, in effect, to afford to the President—who is the one person better than anybody else that can have knowledge of the circumstances of the case—a prompt means of preventing revolts in the neighboring countries, so far as these revolts may be sustained with arms and ammunition which the insurgents might acquire in the United States. This law establishes a justified form of intervention *by abstention;* it is inspired by humanitarian principles and tends to prevent American manufacturers of arms and ammunition from enriching themselves at the expense of the bloodshed and ruin produced by the frequent revolutions which are the curse of the Latin-American countries.

For a man as humanitarian as President Wilson, this law should have been a precious instrument with which to realize peace in Mexico. President Taft decreed the embargo of war materials when Pascual Orozco rebelled

in the State of Chihuahua against President Madero; but President Wilson—as we have seen—in the beginning of the year 1914, raised the embargo which was impeding the development of the "Constitutionalist" revolution. In his eagerness to destroy Huerta, he did not consider that the one immediately favored by the cancellation of the embargo, was Francisco Villa, then the most important figure in the revolution. Neither did President Wilson reflect that Villa and the other Carranzista generals were paying for their arms and ammunition with the products of robbery and confiscation, practiced on a gigantic scale upon Mexicans and foreigners.

Neither the immoral despoliation of the property of others, nor the immoral enrichment of the speculators in war materials, nor the cruel and inhuman form which the struggle had taken, moved President Wilson. "The end justifies the means," he must have said. The end was to overthrow Huerta.

That end was realized, as we have explained in another chapter. The country was in the hands of the "Constitutionalists," and it was to be expected that the activities of the President—if he still persisted in meddling in the internal affairs of Mexico—would have to be directed to favoring the re-establishment of order in the destroyed country.

Nevertheless, the division in the revolutionary files having supervened, Mr. Wilson, notwithstanding the unfavorable reports which he had of Carranza and notwithstanding his open sympathy for Villa, delivered to Carranza the port of Vera Cruz, which resulted in kindling the civil war anew, which the President could have avoided by simply holding for a little longer time the port of Vera Cruz. With incredible hardness of heart, Mr. Wilson sacrificed everything to his personal political interests. (See Chapter V.)

The struggle between the Carranzistas and the Conventionists (of which latter group Villa was the head)

assumed a character of terrible cruelty. Those combatants did not appear to fight against their enemies, but against the immense pacific population. Everyone, who may have followed the changes of this drama, knows the infinite number of attacks upon the honor of women, upon religion, upon property and upon life. A savage struggle in which the Yaquis, barbarous and sanguinary, who formed a part of the hosts of Carranza, the criminals, taken from all the prisons, the Mexican Indian, ignorant and avid for blood and rapine, who formed the bulk of the combatants, satisfied their instincts of bestial ferocity at the expense of fifteen millions of human beings.

Hunger and pestilence increased the ravages of war. The military chiefs made scandalous fortunes, and what they did not appropriate to themselves was sent to the United States to the voracious speculators, who were paid with the bread and tears of the Mexican people for the arms and ammunition which sustained that infernal conflict.

Read the reports of the Red Cross; examine the official data with which the Department of State is stuffed, and it will be seen that while thousands of women and children were dying for lack of food, cargoes of corn, beans, of live stock, and all that could satisfy hunger, went out of the Mexican ports and of the frontier cities to be converted into rifles and cartridges, into instruments of destruction.

Had there ever been a more patent case of "Domestic violence," sustained by American arms and ammunition? There could not be, and there was not, any other source from which they proceeded, since the European war had closed the other markets. One word of President Wilson would have sufficed to put an end to that catastrophe, snatching the deadly instrument from the hands which wielded it. No longer was it the case of overthrowing the "usurper," but that of truly serving humanity and the Mexican people whom the President had declared, by

conduct of the "Saturday Evening Post," the favorite object of his "passion."

Not only did he do nothing which was legally in his hand to do to remedy, or even to alleviate this situation, but, indeed, with an unconsciousness—we will call it so—that stuns, the President said at Indianapolis, on the 8th of January, 1915: "Do you suppose that the American people are ever going to count a small amount of material benefit and advantage to people doing business in Mexico, against the liberties and the permanent happiness of the Mexican people?" But did the President forget those who were doing "business" in Mexico in selling arms and ammunition to the factions? Mr. Wilson alluded to the American miners, to the American agriculturists, to Americans engaged in other industries in Mexico who had seen their legitimate business ruined by the civil war. Let these suffer! but let the sellers of rifles and mitrailleuses and cartridges prosper!

After all, that odious contest was a thing deemed worthy of respect by one who "serves humanity." "Shall we deny the Mexicans the right to spill as much blood as they please?" added the President.

Nevertheless, Mr. Wilson, always inconsistent, changed his position some months afterward and suddenly denied the Mexicans the right to continue "spilling" their blood. Perhaps the President was convinced of what he had not wished to see—that that contest was not "for the liberty and permanent happiness of the Mexican people," but for the satisfaction of the ambitions of two men, Carranza and Villa, in the face of the impotence of an unarmed and hungry people.

On the 2nd of June, 1915, the President launched a severe admonition to the factions, menacing them with intervention.

"For more than two years," said Mr. Wilson, "revolutionary conditions have existed in Mexico. The purpose of the revolution was to rid Mexico of men who ignored

the constitution of the republic and used their power in contempt of the rights of its people, and with these purposes the people of the United States instinctively and generously sympathized. But the leaders of the revolution, in the very hour of their success, have disagreed and turned their arms against one another.

"All professing the same objects, they are, nevertheless, unable or unwilling to co-operate. A central authority at Mexico City is no sooner set up than it is undermined and its authority denied by those who were expected to support it.

"Mexico is apparently no nearer a solution of her tragical troubles than she was when the revolution was first kindled. *And she has been swept by civil war as if by fire.* Her crops are destroyed, her fields lie unseeded, her work cattle are confiscated for the use of the armed factions, her people flee to the mountains to escape being drawn into unavailing bloodshed, and no man seems to see or lead the way to peace and settled order. There is no proper protection either for her own citizens or for the citizens of other nations resident and at work within her territory. *Mexico is starving and without a government.*"

And, indeed, after recognizing the awful condition of Mexico in terms as pathetic as exact, the President continued to abstain from taking the first and most obvious measure that the circumstances imposed: the embargo of arms and ammunition. The President announced that, if the factions did not make peace, "this government will be constrained to decide what means should be employed by the United States." That is to say, the President threatened intervention in Mexico, an illegal act which did not come within his constitutional faculties; and, on the other hand, indulged himself in failing to do what, indeed, was legal and legitimate,—to deprive or entirely cut off from the factions the means of carrying on the diabolical work of destruction!

Not even the most enthusiastic defenders of the ab-

surdities of President Wilson's policy in Mexico, such as Secretary Lane, have had a word of justification for that cruel and inhuman attitude of the President, for his indifference to the sufferings of the Mexican people, for his undissimulated delight in having the Mexicans continue "spilling their blood" with the arms which the President, himself, virtually furnished to them.

Even the most pathetic situations customarily have their comic side. We have just seen how the President, in his Indianapolis speech and in his admonition of the 2nd of June, recognized the existence in Mexico of a terrible condition of "domestic violence."

But the President had never taken into account the fact that this condition was fomented by arms and ammunition obtained in the United States! A providential revelation, a voice from Heaven made known to the President this circumstance on the same day in which he recognized the Carranza faction as the government *de facto!* That very day—October 19th, 1915—the President issued a proclamation establishing an embargo. Then, and only then, was enforced the law, or joint resolution, of the Congress, cited in the first paragraph of this chapter. It was then that Mr. Wilson *discovered* that there had been a condition of violence in Mexico, fomented by American arms and munitions. Then, at last, he decided to restrain the "spilling of blood." For this purpose a proclamation was issued which says: "I, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, do hereby declare and proclaim, THAT I HAVE FOUND (Sic!) that there exists in Mexico *such conditions of domestic violence* promoted by the use of arms and munitions *procured* from the United States as contemplated by the said Joint Resolution * * *". Therefore, the President prohibits, under the penalties of the law, the exportation of arms and ammunition to Mexico.

Of course, this prohibition was not applicable to Carranza. At the same time that he issued the proclamation,

the President ordered the Secretary of the Treasury to permit the "government de facto" to import as many arms and cartridges as it might wish.

This it was that permitted Carranza, first at Parral and afterwards at Carrizal, to kill several officers and soldiers of the army of the United States with American arms and ammunition.

CHAPTER X.

PECUNIARY RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

"Non-intervention in the *internal affairs* of a sister State is the fundamental basis of national independence, and as such is the *first principle of the system of international law now professed by the society of States,*" says a distinguished American professor of international law.

No country can violate this principle with impunity, and, if it does violate it, the pecuniary damages which may be the consequence of the violation are to be charged to the country that commits the infraction.

From the moment in which President Wilson began to intervene in the interior affairs of Mexico, there was born for the United States the correlative obligation of indemnifying all those who suffered in their persons and interests as a consequence of the acts of intervention.

As President Wilson acted in his official character and in exercise of the power of the United States, no one will be able to say that the pecuniary responsibilities alluded to are not to be charged to the United States.

It belongs, then, to the American people to pay the account of the adventure of their President in Mexico.

The interventionist policy of President Wilson has caused, from the pecuniary point of view, two kinds of damages: the indirect, which are ascertainable with difficulty and which, therefore, only involve a moral and historical responsibility; and the direct, which, indeed, can be estimated in dollars and cents. The latter are those which the American tax payer will have to pay sooner or later.

The damages of the first kind indicated are, in truth, incommensurable. When President Wilson began to take a hostile attitude in respect to the government presided over by Huerta, business men, principally the foreigners

who had capital invested in Mexico, began to fear for the fate of their investments. These fears took the character of a veritable panic when Mr. Wilson, by unequivocal acts, signified his purpose to destroy Huerta and to cause the revolution to triumph.

Indeed, no one could, from that moment, have confidence in the country. Huerta was considered, in spite of his defects, as a man capable of preserving order and, therefore, of causing property to be respected. His government inspired such confidence in its first days that without difficulty he succeeded in placing a loan of one hundred and fifty millions with the great banks of Europe.

But when it was seen that his government was sentenced to death by President Wilson (see Chapter III) and that the formidable power of the United States was placed on the side of the revolution, everybody sought the means of protecting his interests. It was indeed a "save himself who can."

No one could have confidence in the revolution, because in this there dominated that which dominates in all Latin-American revolutions: the personal ambition of one, or various men to possess themselves of the government. Only Mr. Wilson, who appears ignorant of the psychology of this kind of revolts, could believe that it was the conscientious movement of a people struggling for liberty; but for those who are acquainted with that psychology, the confidence or want of confidence which the revolution inspired, was measured by the confidence or want of confidence which its leaders inspired.

And the latter could not be less worthy of confidence. Carranza, the nominal chief, had the record of an obscure and servile politician of the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz. He, who had arrived at old age without revealing any aptitude as a statesman, notwithstanding the opportunities which he had had, appeared the least able to place himself at the front of a country so difficult to govern as Mexico. Attention, moreover, was given to the

fact that by the side of Carranza there was none of the men known to be capable of directing and administering public affairs, and that his counselors and co-workers were unknown people and youths who had not attained their thirties.

On the contrary, the second man of the revolution, indeed, appeared strong, formidably strong,—but he was Francisco Villa. Everybody knew his record, in which there was no crime which could not be imputed to him.

The consternation which was caused by seeing the President of the United States pledged to the triumph of these men produced, as a first result, the suspension of all investment of foreign capital in Mexican business. This signified a grave disturbance of the economic situation of Mexico, whose economic balance only can be maintained by means of the uninterrupted influx of outside capital.

A concomitant phenomenon was the withdrawal of capital, which took all possible forms, including that of the emigration of metallic specie.

Thus was initiated the ruin of Mexico. Not only was the development of the riches of the country suspended, but that which already had been accumulated began to dwindle. Confidence being lost in the men,—as unfortunately, none was felt for the institutions which were yet in an embryonic state,—in the presence of the attitude of the American President, pledged to destroy the existing government in order to deliver the fate of the country, not to the people whose immense illiterate majority were not interested in the revolution, but to inept politicians like Carranza or to professional brigands, such as Villa, every man who could disentangle his interests from that menacing situation did it without hesitation and with the greatest possible promptitude.

Who is responsible for this first phase of the economic disaster of Mexico? History will show, in a very distinguished place, the American Government; but it will not be possible to fix its responsibility in cash. The

contrary conclusion is reached in respect to other responsibilities which, by their concrete character, are susceptible of liquidation and payment. With these we will occupy ourselves superficially.

Much is said in the United States about the millions of dollars of American capital invested in Mexico; but it is not known that the English, German, French, Belgian, Dutch and other capital invested in mines, railroads, electric power plants, cotton and textile factories, farms and industries in general, exceeds four hundred millions of dollars. If to this is added the considerable number of bonds and shares of Mexican companies which have been floated in the foreign markets, and the bonds of the Mexican national debt and of semi-official enterprises, like the National Railroads,—the greater part of whose bonds had been placed in Europe—we shall have to conclude that the European capital for which Mexico is responsible amounts, perhaps, to a thousand millions of dollars.

When the moment arises to fix the responsibilities of Mexico they will reach important figures. Not only have properties been destroyed and goods confiscated or stolen by the men of the revolution, but temporary spoliation has occurred, such as the occupation of the railroads and tramway lines, and the paralyzation of industries with grave damage to the operating plants and to the properties themselves. The payment of interest upon bonds has been almost entirely suspended. The national railroads of Mexico owe more than twenty millions of dollars and the government owes a much greater sum in defaulted interest on the public debt.

If confidence in the country should be re-established, as by enchantment, Mexico would be able to pay what may be legitimately to its charge, because its economic life would soon reacquire its vigor; but the first obstacle is the re-establishment of lost confidence.

Because not only have doubts been engendered as to the capacity of the Mexicans to govern their country, but

a new element of distrust has been injected into the situation, and that is the attitude of the government of the United States.

The case of Mexico has revealed a weak point in the political organization of the American people. In this great republic of the North, with its admirable institutions, guaranteeing individual liberty and protection against all despotism, the President, nevertheless, disposes of an arbitrary, unlimited power to manage international affairs. The other mechanisms of the government, such as the courts of justice and the Congress, which can so effectively limit the activities of the President in interior matters, are impotent to influence him when it concerns international affairs. And when a President abandons the wise traditions inherited from the "Fathers" and wishes to launch himself upon the road of innovations in his relations with other countries, the American people are devoid of restrictive means to intercept those activities, however perilous and arbitrary they may be.

Mr. Wilson is one of those innovators. Believing that his mission abroad is not that of protecting the lives and interests of his countrymen, but that of "serving humanity," he found in Mexico a propitious field to apply his theories and caused the ruin of the Mexicans in his eagerness to effect their happiness.

It occurred to Mr. Wilson that the Villa-Carranza revolution was the work of the "submerged eighty-five per cent., who are struggling toward liberty." He was within his rights in believing this, since every man is indeed the master of his own errors; he was in his right in declaring "my passion is for the submerged eighty-five per cent."; but the President entered upon the road of attacks upon international law when he declared: "It is *my part* to aid in composing those differences (between Mexicans) so far as I may be able, that the *new order,* which will have its foundation on human liberty and human rights, *shall prevail.*" "It is not my intention, *having begun this enter-*

prise, to turn back." (Interview of the 23rd of May, 1914, in the Saturday Evening Post).

"When I see the crust even so much as slightly broken over the heads of a population which has always been directed by a board of trustees, I make up my mind that I will thrust not only *my arm* but my heart, in the aperture, and that only by crushing every *ounce of power* that I can use shall any man ever close that opening up again."

This the President said, referring to Mexico, at the banquet which was celebrated in Washington on Jefferson Day on April 13th of the present year. We do not know, of course, which is that "board of trustees" against whom Mr. Wilson thunders; but, in every case, any government whatever in Mexico will always run the risk of being declared a "board of trustees" by the American President, and of having the latter use *even the "last ounce"* of the formidable power of the United States to destroy it.

With these doleful precedents we must repeat, with reason, that the Government of the United States is a new factor of distrust, and, finally, an obstacle to the re-establishment of the economic life of Mexico.

Let us suppose a government established in that country against which any ambitious chief in Chihuahua, or in some other State contiguous with the United States, rises in arms. If the American President should declare that that ambitious chief is a Christ of the down-trodden people, of the "eighty-five per cent." which is the object of the presidential "passion," the revolt will prosper without any doubt. It will avail nothing that a law exists regarding embargo of arms; it will serve for nothing what the treaties and international law may provide: for the President there are no limitations; and just as Mr. Wilson could with impunity sacrifice more than two hundred lives to take Vera Cruz and to hurl Huerta from power, any other president will be able to make use of similar proceedings in an analogous case, without the American people having means to prevent such illegitimate acts.

But let us return to the subject of the pecuniary responsibilities. It is evident that the great nations of Europe are going to make somebody pay what Mexico owes them, and that upon the termination of the great war those impoverished countries will begin to collect all their credits. Those which are charged to Mexico represent sums of consideration.

They will immediately meet with the difficulty of the insolvency of their debtor; but this will not be a serious obstacle. America is rich and it will have to pay the account. Why?

Mexico has incurred these responsibilities, due solely to its condition of anarchy; and if it is proved that the United States is responsible for that condition it will belong to the United States to pay.

For the great powers of Europe the situation will be very clear. They *all* recognized Huerta, taking the position that his government gave them every kind of guaranties. If the United States had, at the same time, accepted Huerta and the latter had failed, Europe would have nothing to say.

But the conclusion is different when the failure of Huerta is imputable to the United States. From the moment in which President Wilson announced that he would overthrow Huerta, (see Chapter III) the basis of the pecuniary responsibilities of the American people was definitely established.

If the attitude of Mr. Wilson had been legitimate, we would have to say another thing; but according to universal doctrine, invoked in the first paragraph of this chapter, the United States violated a fundamental principle of international law, first in overthrowing Huerta, and second, in aiding Villa and Carranza. If, indeed, these acts of the American Government have been translated into enormous pecuniary losses, the United States will have to indemnify the European countries injured thereby.

This is true, speaking in general terms, but we could enter into concrete cases. We will limit ourselves with a few.

The occupation of Vera Cruz would have had certain aspects of legitimacy if it had been due to the incident of the salute to the flag, as the President made the people and Congress believe; but it is proved that that occupation had two illegitimate objects neither of which was the business of the President of the United States: "To serve humanity and the Mexicans," and to overthrow Huerta.

The occupation of Vera Cruz caused enormous losses to the great railroad enterprise known as the "Mexican Railroad," which belongs to an English company. That railroad connects Vera Cruz, the first port of Mexico, with the capital, touching the important cities of Cordoba, Orizaba and Puebla. The greater part of the commerce and importations of Mexico, and much of the exportation, was made at that time over that line. The traffic was suddenly interrupted by the landing of the American forces.

Is Mexico going to pay for the pecuniary responsibilities which the British Government will exact, in due time, for the enormous losses which that railroad suffered? And why has Mexico to respond for the claims of other governments, such, for example, as the French, for the losses and damages which the great French textile and cotton factories of Orizaba suffered and which were also damaged by the occupation of Vera Cruz?

Many other cases could be cited. For example, President Wilson urged Americans to leave Mexico without delay, causing them to believe that war was going to be declared against the Government of Huerta. Those men who had no motive of complaint against the Mexican Government abandoned all their properties and interests and many of them were ruined. Is Mexico going to pay the claims which will be presented by these direct victims of the caprices of Mr. Wilson?

We sincerely believe that all the pecuniary indemnities

which will be exacted from Mexico, as a consequence of its state of anarchy, from the date that the so-called constitutionalist revolution was started up to the present time, will have to be borne by the United States, for the illegitimate and baneful participation which its government took in Mexican affairs. Because it must be remembered that the United States—or its President—not only destroyed a government, but it imposed upon the country an inept and rapacious faction. Later when this faction was split and a new contest developed, more destructive and cruel than the previous one, the United States promoted that contest, by delivering Vera Cruz to Carranza and thus preventing the elimination of that chieftain. Then, when anarchy had arrived to frightful extremes the President limited himself with directing admonitions of lofty rhetoric to the contending parties, but made no use of the remedy which he was legally able to apply: the embargo upon arms and munitions.

All this is to be paid for, because it resulted in damages estimable in money.

Much has been said that Mexico will be obliged to make compensation for the lives of the Americans who have been victims of bandits and revolutionists; but it is forgotten that the United States has equivalent responsibilities to Mexico. So far as it concerns lives, it is clear that the United States will have to pay for the Mexicans sacrificed in Vera Cruz from the moment in which the occupation of this port may be declared an unwarranted attack, as it is.

As for other responsibilities, there will always be a Mexican counter-claim to oppose to any American claim whatever, considering that we Mexicans have suffered more than any one else from the supervising and meddlesome action of the United States.

But let us put to one side the responsibilities estimable in money. When, before the tribunal of Universal Conscience, when, before the Supreme Court of Civilization,

the cause of Mexico is presented, the moral responsibilities of the United States will be defined and the present administration will be stigmatized for having caused the loss of many honest and legitimate interests, for not having enforced respect for the rights of its own citizens, for having shed blood and having caused tears to flow without proper cause, for having, in fine, precipitated to its ruin a nation which, although weak and infirm, has given proofs in the past of not needing foreign tutors who employ in the service of their own ignorance and pride the invincible power of a great nation.

CHAPTER XI.

FALSE POSTULATES

"The Struggle for Liberty." "The Fight for the Land."—The Concessionaires.

"My passion is for the submerged eighty-five per cent. of the people of that republic, *who are now struggling toward liberty,*" said Mr. Wilson in May, 1914, referring to the revolution whose most conspicuous figure was then Francisco Villa. (Interview in the Saturday Evening Post).

Who compose that eighty-five per cent.? Mr. Wilson himself undertakes to say: "The present revolution, like all preceding revolutions, is primarily a revolution by the *peons,* who want to regain their land"; and he adds that the revolution was "a fight for the land, just that and nothing more."

Let us pass over the statement that all revolutions in Mexico have been for the land,—a statement that makes any student of Mexican history smile—and let us limit ourselves to analyzing very briefly the character of the Villa-Carranza revolution.

Let it be observed, in the first place, that all the revolutionary armies together, besides all the bands of brigands who called themselves revolutionists, never reached 150,000 men; that is to say, one per cent. of the total population. It is surprising that when the eighty-five per cent. of the population; that is, let us say, ten millions, were "struggling toward liberty," this enormous human mass only produced such an insignificant number of effective fighters. On the other hand during the revolution there never occurred any of those gigantic popular convulsions which characterize the uprisings of every people which shakes off the yoke of its oppressors. If the revolution had been the work of the ten millions, we would have witnessed similar pictures to those which history presents in

cases of a true popular struggle for liberty. We would have seen the people unite themselves to the liberating armies, and, thereupon, in the shelter of their conquered liberty, create the instruments which insure life, property, and the free exercise of civic rights. We would have seen the town councils, the local governments, the representative assemblies, reconstructed. We would have heard the voice of the tribunes of the people calling to the citizens, like Danton to the people of Paris, to organize the revolutionary government. We would have seen something, in fine, which would indicate the participation of the masses, although it might be at the hour of the triumph against the oppressors. However, we saw nothing of this kind.

The Revolutionists entered a place, and the inhabitants, terrorized, shut themselves up in their houses, concealed their wives and their daughters to save them from the lust of those ferocious beasts, and concealed their properties to save them from pillage. In the great cities there were customarily acclamations and friendly receptions for the victors, inspired more by fear of being considered unfriendly than by a legitimate enthusiasm; but nowhere was seen the popular effort to draw from that triumph any advantage for the effectiveness of the public liberties. Martial law was the form in which the revolutionary authority was exercised. The military tribunal, without law, and arbitrary, substituted the civil tribunal; the military commander took the place of the municipal council; the military governor that of the civil governor of the state and the "First Chief" substituted the President of the Republic, the Congress and the federal courts of justice.

The fact is that the Constitutionalist revolution was, like the majority of Latin-American revolutions, the movement of some audacious men, seconded by some men sincere and of good faith and by many merciless brigands, in the face of the absolute passivity and the stupefaction of the great mass of the population which, by invincible

idiosyncrasy, is incapable of organizing itself for defence or of feeling enthusiasm for the struggle.

Those who are ignorant of the character of the peoples in which the Indian element and the mixed Spanish-Indian element dominate, do not understand this. Those who are only acquainted with the history of the Anglo-Saxon races are incapable of comprehending this Sphinx-like attitude of an entire people in the face of the greatest disasters; but so it is, and this constitutes one of the greatest disadvantages for democratic progress in the countries in which the Indian element dominates. The Latin-American countries in which the white race predominates have entered into other paths.

The first thing which the revolution did at dominating in any zone was to establish, as we have said, a regime of military despotism; and alas how idle it is to speak of public liberties!

It will be said that this was necessary as a measure of transition; but this transitory state has been maintained for two years, during which there have been prohibited, under penalty of death, political meetings, the publication of independent newspapers and every manifestation toward the liberty for which, according to Mr. Wilson, the people had been struggling.

Every legislative assembly, local, state and national, has been absolutely suppressed and the courts of justice abolished, and in their place has been set up an autocrat whose power has no limitations; who not only dictates all laws, but constitutes himself their sole judge and executive. (See decree issued by Carranza in Vera Cruz on the 12th of December, 1914, which we publish as an appendix).

Mr. Wilson has heard it said that in Mexico there is an agrarian problem and has asserted, as we have seen, that the "Constitutionalist" revolution was a "Fight for the land, just that and nothing more"; but surely he does

not know that the men who made this supposed agragian revolution did not demand nor have they ever demanded that land be given them.

The rural population of Mexico, four or five millions of Indian field laborers, did not make the revolution. As the negro slaves of the South maintained themselves passive and faithful while their masters were fighting against the liberating armies of the Union, "the peons" as Mr. Wilson says, have remained indifferent in the presence of a struggle which could have given them the opportunity of redeeming themselves. The most that they have done, and that in a very small number, has been to unite themselves to the armies of anarchy to satisfy their lust and their thirst for blood and rapine, always latent in the heart of the uncultivated Indian; but it is useless to try to discover in the co-called "Constitutionalist" movement a defined effort for the conquest of the land. That which has been, indeed, a "Fight for the land" is the "Zapatista" movement; and, with inexplicable inconsistency Mr. Wilson has never shown any interest in that movement. The Indians of the State of Morelos, with Zapata as their leader, have made an agrarian revolution, but Carranza, the agrarianist of Mr. Wilson, is trying to suppress Zapatism with blood and fire! Carranza employs against the agrarianists of Morelos the same cruel procedure which Huerta employed; and up to now we do not know that Mr. Wilson, who sympathizes so much with the imaginary Villa-Carranza agrarian movement, has made a single manifestation of support for those who, in truth, are fighting for the land.

The economic and intellectual situation of the Indian in Mexico, as in the greater part of the Spanish-American countries from Guatemala to Paraguay, constitutes a grave problem which will be solved when a majority of the Indian field laborers are converted into farmers with a direct interest in the land. With this two important results would be obtained in Mexico, to wit:

In the first place, it would make of these men, now passive elements and victims of the landlords as well as of the revolutionist "liberators," factors for the conservation of social order and for the arrest of anarchy, which will happen from the moment in which the Indians, by their own direct interest in the land are able to form a patrimony; and, in the second place, it would encourage the progress of agriculture, to-day not only backward in its methods, but insufficient in its development to feed the national population, in spite of the great extension of the territory.

The agrarian problem considered from its most serious point of view, which is that of the regime of rural property, presents difficulties of an economic and juridical kind which would put to the test the knowledge of the most expert statesmen. The property regime in Mexico is the product of economic and historical causes which have come down through centuries, since the remote epoch of the conquest of Mexico by the Spaniards. Therefore, it is senseless to say that by proceedings of confiscatory despoliation, or military decrees, as Mr. Carranza has pretended to do, that regime can be corrected.

As experience has amply demonstrated, it will serve for nothing to divide up the land among the Indians, for the latter, for want of resources and because of their ignorance, are not capable of keeping it. Nor is it possible to establish a country of small proprietors wherein there are no institutions of rural credit or ways of communication or the other elements and facilities which exist in countries where agrarian property is subdivided among numerous cultivators.

To accomplish the realization of all this, which is the labor of years, a constitutional government is required, which will subject its proceedings to the laws, and which will enjoy a firm credit; that is to say, a government precisely different from that of which Carranza is the head.

Among the false postulates of Mr. Wilson, the one

which merits especial mention is that which refers to the "Concessionaires." To justify his strange omission to care for his countrymen in Mexico, Mr. Wilson always alludes to them in a form which smells of Wall Street or of Standard Oil; with the result that Americans interested in Mexico are made to appear, in the opinion of many of their fellow-citizens, as blood-suckers that merit not only the abandonment of their government but universal execration. These are the "Americans pressing for things they could never have got in their own country," Mr. Wilson said in the speech in which he accepted his candidacy.

We shall pass over the circumstances that the *majority* of the Americans in Mexico are employees, engineers, small farmers, small merchants and professional men, almost all of whom have, on account of the revolution, lost the little and only property they had in the world; and we shall refer ourselves only to the "sharks." Who are the latter?

This matter of concessionaires in Mexico is a bugaboo to frighten not only the foolish, but men as expert as President Wilson and Secretary Lane. The latter, in the defence of the Mexican policy of President Wilson, alluded to several times in this book, arrives to the extreme of asserting that it has been the custom of the Mexican government "to sell concessions in order to support itself". Probably Mr. Lane confuses Mexico with some other country, as he did confuse Porfirio Diaz with the Venezuelan dictator, Guzman Blanco; but the distinguished Secretary should know that since the year 1893 up to the fall of President Madero—twenty years—the Mexican government never sold a concession, and that, to sustain its necessities it never resorted to those expedients, because among other things in that year it adopted an admirable system of budgets based on the previous limitation of the expenses in view of the probable and previously calculated income from revenues. This

progress has not been attained even by the government of the United States, which still arranges its expenses by the unfortunate method of the "pork barrel."

Of course, what has been said does not apply to the government "de facto", the creature of Mr. Wilson, which indeed has sold concessions to American "sharks", an instance of which is that of the sisal monopoly.

In the early days of the government of General Diaz, some twenty-five or thirty years ago, certain odious concessions were granted; but what has generally been called "concessions", given in the last twenty-five years, are such only in name.

To develop her great resources, Mexico, a country without capital, needed to resort to foreign capital, and the government of General Diaz had to employ certain stimuli to induce capitalists to invest their money in a country which, on account of its turbulent past, inspired little confidence. Therefore, the following system was adopted: any one who would oblige himself to invest a certain amount of capital in an enterprise was exempted *for a certain number of years* from certain kinds of taxes, and was permitted *for a limited time* to import free of customs duties the machinery and tools which he needed for his industry. This contractor—the concessionaire as he was called—signed a contract that imposed upon him the obligation of expending in his enterprise a stated amount, and guaranteed his obligation by a deposit of government bonds. In exchange for this, in consideration of the advantages which his industry afforded to the country, the government conceded the exemptions above pointed out. On the other hand, if the concessionaire defaulted in complying with the obligations which the contract imposed upon him, he lost the deposit of guaranty, and the exemptions that were granted him thereby ceased.

Sometimes these concessions only were given to the founder of an industry new to the country; but the general rule was that they were granted to everybody that

solicited them and offered the securities required by the law. They were not then monopolies, nor were they granted for every industry in general, but for some things especially important for the development of the natural resources of the country.

Under the protection of these "concessions" there were established, in Mexico, industries which, like the smelting of ores, increased the mineral production of the country more than one thousand per cent. At the present time no smelting company enjoys exemptions, and they are all in the same legal condition as those of the same kind in the United States.

Some of the companies producing petroleum obtained also "concessions" such as those that have been described. The veins or deposits of oil belong in Mexico to the owner of the soil, and the "concessionaires" only obtained—in return for the obligation of investing large amounts of capital in the development of this industry—a limited exemption from customs duties in the form above explained, the term of which has expired in the great majority of cases. Exemption which also was given them to export their products, without paying export taxes, was simply nominal, since the government, under various pretexts, has evaded it.

Contrary to what is generally believed, the great quantity of petroleum which is extracted in Mexico does not proceed from national land, but from lands which companies and private individuals have purchased from their owners. Lord Cowdray, himself,—who is not an American but an Englishman, and who indeed has a concession to exploit petroleum in lands of the public domain —operates almost solely upon private lands under leases with their owners.

The railroad companies have received frequent subsidies in the form of a payment in bonds or in cash for each section of railroad constructed. These Mexican concessions are mere child's play by the side of those that

the government of the United States gave to the great lines which opened up the West and which received gigantic gifts in money and in public lands.

On the other hand, the Mexican railroads, which never have received any lands, have the obligation to transport the mails *free of charge;* and under the law—with the exception of one line which belongs to an English company—must become the property of the nation at the end of ninety-nine years, without any cost whatever to the latter.

We could continue our analysis to destroy this fantasm of the concessions, which only exists in the imagination of one who does not know what Mexico is.

We shall not deny that during the regime of General Diaz enormous business was created under the protection of the government, the same as happens in the United States and in the whole world. In Mexico also there are "deserving Democrats" who thrive on official aid; these we call "cientificos," but in general the situation in this matter is totally different from what Mr. Wilson asserts with as much emphasis as lack of foundation.

Those "concessionaires" whom Mr. Wilson nails to the cross of his hatred before the jeers of his fellow-citizens, are, nevertheless, factors of the first importance for the progress of Mexico and are the heralds of friendship and good understanding between both peoples. From those "concessionaires", who today are not working on account of the reigning anarchy, the authorities de facto almost daily demand, with prayers and with threats, that they shall renew their paralyzed industries in order to arrest the horrible state of misery and in order to give bread to millions of hungry Mexicans.

We shall terminate this chapter with a citation which has a happy application to our case.

Treating of the policy of Thaddeus Stevens and other leaders of the American Congress in the period of reconstruction, the historian Woodrow Wilson says that they

"did not know the region with which they were dealing"; and adds that "Northern men who did know it tried to inform them of its character and of *the danger and folly* of what they were undertaking; *but they refused to be informed, did not care to know,* WERE IN ANY CASE FIXED UPON THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A SINGLE OBJECT." With this conduct those leaders "had prepared the way for the ruin of the South, but they had hardly planned to ruin it". (Woodrow Wilson's History of the American People, Vol. 5. page 50).

Why does Mr. Wilson see things in one manner as an historian and in another manner as President? That with which he reproaches the leaders of Congress, we Mexicans have the right to reproach him with; to manage a situation without knowledge of it, to refuse all information regarding it, and to fix himself upon the fulfillment of a single purpose,—to ruin Mexico, as the politicians of reconstruction ruined the South, without, nevertheless, having the purpose of ruining it.

CHAPTER XII.

THE POWER OF WORDS.

"He has kept us out of Mexico."

President Wilson, who, after all, is a man and a politician, has tried to obscure the true issues of the Mexican question by making the public believe that he has saved the United States from a war with Mexico.

In one of his last speeches, in order to signify how his supposed attitude accords with the general feeling, Mr. Wilson referred to the engineer of a train on which he was traveling, who had said to him in a tone of entreaty: "Mr. President, keep us out of Mexico."

Acquainted with human frivolity, it was of little importance to Mr. Wilson that his acts are in constant contradiction with his words and that the latter frequently contradict each other. That which sounds best to the ear is the only thing that prevails, and the fallacy, that it is due to Mr. Wilson that there is no war, works marvels even among serious persons.*

We have alluded to the contradictions of Mr. Wilson. These are so many and so frequent that it would be a task to exhibit them all. We will limit ourselves, then, to some few.

Notwithstanding the interminable series of acts of political and armed intervention which he has executed in Mexico, and that the reader has seen enumerated in the preceding chapters, the President said in his speech at Indianapolis: " . . . so far as my influence goes, while I am President nobody shall interfere with them" (the

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*NOTE: A man as eminent as Mr. Edison (See New York Times, September 4, 1916) has just declared for the re-election of Wilson among other reasons because the President has acted, in relation to Mexico, "wisely, justly and courageously." It is clearly seen that Mr. Edison, who has little time to study these things, has fallen a victim to the enchantment of words.

Mexicans); and in his speech at Columbus he expressed himself thus: "The Mexicans may not know what to do with their government, but that is none of our business; and so long as I have the power to prevent it nobody shall butt in to alter it for them."

On the other hand, in his speech on Jefferson Day, he asserted that it would be necessary to destroy even the last ounce of power of which he disposed, before any government should be established in Mexico that would not be approved by Mr. Wilson.

"I do not know how many men came to me", said the President at Columbus, Ohio, "and suggested that the government of Mexico should be altered as we thought it ought to be altered, but being a subscriber to the doctrine of the Virginia Bill of Rights I could not agree with them". And nevertheless John Lind went to Mexico to demand that the government *should be* altered as President Wilson thought that it ought to be altered.

In his speech at Columbus, the President stated that the people had the right to alter or abolish by any means whatever—even that of insurrection, as has been done in Mexico—governments which are "unsuitable to the life of the people"; and a few weeks afterwards, namely, on the 6th of January, 1916, the President made a speech in Washington in which he proposed to the Pan-American Scientific Congress the celebration of treaties between the countries of this continent, which should have, among other objects, "to prohibit the exportation of the munitions of war for the purpose of supplying revolutionists against neighboring governments"; that is to say, he proposed a measure to make the exercise of the right of insurrection impossible and which would have prevented Mr. Wilson from raising the embargo on munitions for the benefit of Villa and Carranza.

Lastly, in order not to make this tedious enumeration interminable, we shall finish by citing a passage from the

speech which Mr. Wilson delivered in New York on the 27th of January, 1916:

"America has always stood resolutely and absolutely for the right of every people to determine its own destiny and its own affairs. I am absolutely a disciple of that doctrine and I am ready to do that thing and observe that principle *in dealing with the troubled affairs of our distressed neighbor to the south*". (Speech in Aeolian Hall).

Here again the contradiction between words and deeds is patent. To say that he has applied to Mexico the principles that the latter has the right to determine its affairs by itself alone, is a mere sarcasm to any one who knows that, from the mission of John Lind up to the recognition of Carranza, the President has done nothing else than *to determine* the affairs of Mexico.

But, we repeat it, the public little perceives these incredible incongruities, and men as respectable as Mr. Edison are blinded to the degree of believing that Mr. Wilson has not intervened in Mexico. (Note to this chapter). And the President, a profound psychologist, referred with delight to what the plain people said through the mouth of the railroad engineer, adding that so long as he should be President he would keep the United States "out of Mexico"!

What is meant by the statement that the President has kept the United States "out of Mexico"?

It cannot mean that the President has not intervened in the affairs of Mexico,—which he has done in the most high-handed and perilous manner; nor does it mean that the United States has not carried on war in Mexico, since the affair of Vera Cruz, that of Parral and that of Carrizal have cost many more American soldiers' lives than the celebrated naval battles of Manila and Santiago de Cuba.

It may be said that those have not been real wars, because the operations have not been continued; but does the merit of this belong to the President of the United States? Surely not. The occurrence of Vera Cruz was

a *casus belli* provoked by Mr. Wilson; but the latter had the good fortune that Huerta did not pick up the glove. With only a declaration of war from the Mexican dictator, with only an attack upon General Funston in Vera Cruz, or if any city of the Texas frontier had been destroyed by Huerta's forces, a general war would have been inevitable.

Nothing of this kind happened, because Mr. Wilson found in Huerta an enemy "too proud to fight"; but this fortuitous circumstance, foreign to the will of the President, should not be credited to him as a title to the gratitude of the people.

When the partisans of Mr. Wilson said: "We have no war with Mexico—thank God for Wilson," they should have said, in justice: "Thank God for Huerta".

And what of Parral and Carrizal? Already we have proved that the punitive expedition is an illegal invasion of the territory of Mexico which Carranza did not oppose through cowardice and weakness. Carranza nevertheless had to later yield to the pressure of public opinion and proposed not to permit the advance of General Pershing; but if instead of limiting himself to this, Carranza had attacked the American column, war would have been inevitable.

In this case, as in that of Vera Cruz, the armed and illegal invasion of Mexican territory, the provocative act of war, was the work of President Wilson. To thank him for not having had war, when the American people owes this service to Huerta and to Carranza, is to see things contrariwise. The weakness and the cowardice of two Mexican dictators have saved the situation. Huerta and Carranza are creditors for the adoration of Mr. Bryan and other American pacifists.

A war of invasion, armed intervention, would have been, on the other hand, a great crime, in spite of the attacks of which the citizens of the United States in Mexico have been the victims, in spite of the incursions

into Texas and New Mexico. All these acts are the consequence of a state of anarchy fomented by the government of the United States and sustained with American arms and munitions whose exportation President Wilson was able to prevent. The terrible consequences of the absurd policy of Mr. Wilson ought not to be corrected with the commission of a crime, which the subjugation of an entire people by arms would be, a people which has suffered more than any one else from the work of its officious protector.

The sane, legal and just policy would have been to do nothing that Mr. Wilson has done. The critics of the latter are reproached, that they limit themselves to criticising; and that they do not suggest what it would have been necessary to do; but this observation has no weight. What ought to have been done, what indeed still must be done, is precisely what Mr. Wilson does not do, which is to abstain from meddling in things which are beyond his legal competency as President and beyond his knowledge as a man.

It was within his right not to recognize Huerta, but it was not his mission to overthrow Huerta and to aid Villa and Carranza. From intrusion to instrusion Mr. Wilson has arrived to the extremes at which he finds himself today, without knowing how to extricate himself from the entanglement. The Mexican territory invaded by a *punitive* column which does not *punish*, and cannot advance without provoking conflict, a humiliating situation for Mexicans and a shameful one for the United States; Mexico devoured by anarchy, with its economic life paralyzed, with its people dying of hunger and pestilence; the interests of foreigners which Mexico so much needs in order to live, suffering damage by the stopping of the fountains of riches, by the want of laws and constitutional guaranties and by the suspension of the administration of justice. All this melancholy picture is

the result of many factors, but chiefly of the Wilsonian policy.

To abandon this policy is the important thing, that Mexico may raise herself alone if she can. She has been able to do so on other occasions, when she has had the good fortune that no one desired to play the "big brother" to her. The United States should limit herself to demanding guaranties for its citizens: this it has the right to do, and in it we Mexicans could not find any cause of offense, but we do not wish to be managed, under pretext of offering us aid, by one who does not understand us or our character or our history or our complication of races of our language.

Unfortunately for Mexicans, a new factor has entered into the situation of Mexico, in these last days; the electoral fortunes of Mr. Wilson.

To exploit the ultra-pacifist sentiment of many, a great comedy is played with its martial scenario very well staged, in which are made to figure as supernumeraries all the forces of the army and militia of the United States.

One hundred and fifty thousand soldiers to protect this powerful country from some hundreds of brigands!

Terrified before such a combination of warlike measures, before such a menacing picture, which raises the fear of imminent conflict, the credulous public love to applaud the prudence of Mr. Wilson for causing this thunder-cloud to dissolve in the placidity of the conferences of New London.

Once more is this people "kept out of war" by the magic of Mr. Wilson, by his supreme diplomacy!

Carranza, on his side, plays with affability the part assigned to him, convinced that it is to his interest to aid the electoral triumph of Mr. Wilson. The "First Chief" has been able to prove all the force that his stubborn and obstinate character has over the vacillating spirit of President Wilson. It will be remembered in effect—to cite some of the many examples—that when Wilson asked

Carranza to attend the conference of Niagara Falls, the latter firmly refused, with which Mr. Wilson conformed; that when Wilson opposed the demand of Carranza for the unconditional surrender of Carvajal, Wilson yielded finally to the demand of Carranza; that when the latter was invited by Wilson to celebrate peace with the Villa faction, Carranza answered that it was not the "business" of Wilson to meddle in the contests of Mexicans, to which Mr. Wilson had nothing to reply; that when the American government, associated with six complacent Latin-American governments, invited the factions to a conference of peace, Carranza was the only one who rejected the invitation in haughty form, demanding, in exchange, that he be recognized, which was quickly done; that although President Wilson had announced himself as "the champion of constitutional government on this continent" and had declared that he would not have as a government in Mexico one which should not be regulated by the constitution of the country, he nevertheless recognized the dictator Carranza; that when the punitive expedition took place, Carranza prohibited the American forces from using the Mexican railroads and from entering the towns and villages, to all of which Mr. Wilson acceded with meekness; that when Carranza forbade the column of General Pershing from advancing further south, Mr. Wilson immediately obeyed; that in spite of the fact that Mr. Wilson had menaced with "the gravest consequences" any act of violence against the forces of the punitive expedition, Carranza destroyed an American column in Carrizal, and "the gravest consequences" of this act were the invitation to the conferences of New London, with excursions on the Presidential yacht "Mayflower", and other unheard of courtesies to the representatives of Carranza.

All this the "First Chief" knows, and, as is natural, he now places at the service of the electoral fortunes of Mr. Wilson the part of the scenic apparatus which has been allotted to him.

For that, the chairman of the Carranza delegation in New London declared that the enemies of the Democratic party were the enemies of the "First Chief"!

We understand that in this country of democratic institutions, the President is not a Czar, nor a Kaiser, nor a "war lord", upon whose caprice depends war or peace. The contrary would be a humiliation for the free citizens of this great republic. They ought not, then, to thank President Wilson that there is no *war,* when there is no *motive* for war.

There *is no motive* for war with Mexico. The causes of friction, which are produced with such lamentable frequency, are imputable, as we have proved, to the ill advised policy of the President of the United States. The engineer of the presidential train who said: "Mr. President, keep *us* out of Mexico", should have said: "Mr. President, *keep out* of Mexico".

THE END.

APPENDIX.

We have referred in this book, to the remarkable decree of Carranza in which he declares himself invested with all the powers of the people, not only those vested on the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Federal Powers but on the state powers as well. In the face of this decree, which creates the most astounding form of dictatorship that Mexico has known, President Wilson recognized Carranza.

The decree referred to reads as follows:

I, Venustiano Carranza, *have seen fit* to decree the following:

Article 1. The plan of Guadalupe of March 26, 1913, shall subsist until the complete triumph of the revolution, and, therefore, Citizen Venustiano Carranza shall continue in his post as first chief of the constitutionalist revolution and as depository of the executive power of the nation, until the enemy is overpowered and peace is restored.

Article 2. The first chief of the revolution and depository of the executive power of the Republic, *shall enact* and *enforce*, during the struggle, *all the laws, provisions, and measures tending to meet the economic, social, and political needs of the country*, carrying into effect the reforms which public opinion demands as indispensable for the establishment of a régime which will guarantee the equality of Mexicans among themselves, agrarian laws favoring the creation of small landowners, the suppression of latifundia or large landholders, and the restoration to townships of the lands illegally taken from them; fiscal laws tending to establish an equitable system of taxation on real estate; laws tending to improve the condition of the rural laborer, the workingman, the miner, and, in general, of the working classes; the establishment of municipal freedom as a constitutional institution; bases for a new system of organization of the army; amendments of the election laws in order to insure the effectiveness of suffrage; organization of an independent judicial power, in the federation as well as in the States; revision of the laws relative to marriage and the civil status of persons; provisions guaranteeing the strict observance of the laws of reform; revision of the civil, penal, and com-

mercial codes; amendment of judicial procedure, for the purpose of expediting and causing the effectiveness of the administration of justice; revision of laws relative to the exploitation of mines, petroleum, water rights, forests, and other natural resources of the country, in order to destroy the monopolies created by the old régime and to prevent the formation of new ones; political reforms which will insure the absolute observance of the constitution of Mexico, and, in general, *all the other laws which may be deemed necessary to insure for all the inhabitants of the country* the effectiveness and full enjoyment of their rights, and their equality before the laws.

Article 3. In order to continue the struggle and to carry into effect the reforms referred to in the preceding article, *the chief of the revolution is hereby expressly authorized* to convene and organize the constitutionalist army and direct the operations of the campaign; *to appoint the governors* and military commanders *of the States and to remove them freely;* to effect the expropriations on account of public utility which may be necessary for the distributions of lands, founding of townships, and other public services; to negotiate loans and issue obligations against the national treasury, indicating the property which shall guarantee them; to appoint and remove freely federal employees of the civil administration *and of the States* and to fix the powers *of each of them;* to make, either directly or through the chiefs he may appoint, requisitions for lands, buildings, arms, horses, vehicles, provisions, and other elements of war; and to create decorations and decree recompenses for services rendered to the revolution.

Article 4. Upon the success of the revolution, when the supreme chieftainship may be established in the city of Mexico and after the elections for municipal councils in the majority of the States of the Republic, the first chief of the revolution, as depository of the executive power, shall issue the call for election of congressmen, fixing in the calls the dates and terms in which the elections shall be held.

Article 5. Once the federal congress has been installed, the chief of the revolution shall render an account before it of the use he may have made of the powers with which he is vested hereby, and he shall especially submit the reforms made and put into effect during the struggle, in order that congress may *ratify them, amend them,* or *supplement them,* and to the end that those which it may see fit may be raised to the rank of constitutional precepts, before the re-establishment of constitutional order.

Article 6. The federal congress shall convoke the people to the election of president of the Republic, and as soon as this takes place the first chief of the revolution shall deliver to the president elect the executive power of the nation.

Article 7. In case of absolute default of the present chief of the revolution, and until the generals and governors proceed to the election of the person who is to take his place, the chief office shall be temporarily filled by the commander of the army corps at the place where the revolutionary government may be at the time the default of the first chief occurs.

V. Carranza.
Adolfo de la Huerta.
Chief Clerk of the Department of the Interior.

Constitution and Reforms,
Vera Cruz, December 12, 1914.

The above decree has taken the place of the Constitution of Mexico. One cannot fail to recall with a deep feeling of discouragement the following words uttered by President Wilson as an excuse for not having recognized Huerta: "We are *the champions of constitutional government* in this continent!"

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